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1. Introduction 
Global financial intermediation has changed significantly since 2008. Cross-border 
capital flows have contracted sharply (Figure 1), mainly due to a reduction in 
international bank lending. In contrast, FDI and international portfolio exposures have 
not declined by nearly as much and have bounced back since the 2008 crisis (Figure 2). 
This evolution in cross-border bank lending has been described as “financial 
deglobalisation” (Forbes, 2014) and “the great cross-border bank deleveraging” (Cerutti 
and Claessens, 2014). It can be divided into two stages: the sharp initial contraction that 
occurred during the crisis, and a more recent decline that began in 2012—what we refer 
to as the “second phase of banking deglobalisation”. This most recent decline in 
international lending stands in sharp contrast to the relative stability in domestic bank 
lending over the same period, in both the UK and the world (Figure 3). Proposed 
explanations for the initial phase of banking deglobalisation include government 
intervention in the banking system (Rose and Wieladek, 2014), increased home bias 
(Giannetti and Laeven, 2012), reduced demand for loans, and reduced availability of 
wholesale funding for banks.1 Although a substantial literature has analysed various 
effects of regulatory and unconventional monetary policy, no previous work has 
examined whether these policies could be an important factor behind this contraction in 
global banking.2  Also, no other work has studied the second phase of banking 
deglobalisation. This paper aims to fill these gaps.  
Many countries have significantly tightened bank regulations over the past few 
years (such as shown in Figure 4a for UK capital requirements) in order to strengthen the 
resilience of their financial systems. At the same time, many of the world’s major central 
banks pursued unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative easing (shown in 
Figure 4b for the UK), and credit easing aimed at stimulating aggregate demand. While 
these policies are obvious candidate explanations for the contraction in cross-border bank 
                                                 
1 See Cerutti and Claessens (2014) and Forbes (2014) for more detailed discussion of various potential causes. 
2 Most papers examining the impact of unconventional monetary policy focus on the effects on domestic and international 
financial market prices. Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub (2013), Ahmed and Zlate (2013), and Koepke (2014) are some of the 
few examples of papers which instead assess the impact on global capital flows, especially to emerging markets. 
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lending, there are several reasons why no other work has evaluated their effects 
empirically. First, distinguishing between cross-border loan supply and demand is 
difficult. Second, the temporal clustering of these different policies, in direct response to 
the financial crisis in most countries, makes disentangling their individual effects 
challenging using only time-series data. Finally, it is difficult (if not impossible) to obtain 
the necessary data on all the relevant policies in most countries.  
This paper is able to address these challenges with a unique UK dataset combined 
with the policy responses of the UK over this period. The dataset includes external bank 
lending by country, which we have merged with detailed regulatory data3 on 
microprudential capital requirements, as well as with information on bank balance sheets 
and different forms of unconventional monetary policy. The resulting bank-country-time 
panel allows us to separate country-specific loan demand from supply via country-time 
effects (as in Aiyar et al., 2014). The UK also actively used different regulatory and 
unconventional monetary policies after the peak of the financial crisis: UK quantitative 
easing was conducted from 2009-2013; micro-prudential regulatory requirements were 
adjusted throughout; and the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS), a policy designed to 
stimulate domestic lending, was introduced in July 2012. Finally, the UK is an ideal case 
study because UK-resident banks are at the heart of the global financial system and have 
played a major role in the deglobalisation of bank flows.4 Consequently, this dataset and 
the interplay of various UK policies over this time period allow us to identify and tackle 
the important question of what has caused the recent contraction in international bank 
lending. 
Our results suggest that increases in capital requirements, and their interactions 
with certain types of unconventional monetary policies, have led to a significant 
reduction in international bank lending. We find that an increase in a bank’s capital 
requirement of 100 basis points leads to a contraction in its external lending growth of 
                                                 
3 To construct a continuous series of microprudential capital requirements, it was necessary to merge data across three different 
regulatory forms, as reporting requirements changed substantially over this time period. 
4 UK banks provide more international loans (bank-to-bank assets) than any other country in the world, with 15% of 
international interbank activity booked in the UK and the average UK bank lending to 53 countries. Cross-border UK bank 
assets and liabilities both contracted by over 2% of global GDP from 2008Q4 through 2013Q4—the largest contraction in 
global interbank activity corresponding to an individual country over this period. 
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about 3.4%. For banks which specialised in FLS-eligible lending (before the introduction 
of this policy), the effects of increased capital requirements were amplified by a 
significant amount. More specifically, the same increase in a bank’s capital requirement 
led to a larger contraction in external lending under the FLS—with estimates suggesting a 
substantial amplification effect for the average bank. The evidence suggests that this is not 
the case for quantitative easing (QE). The main results on the significant effects of 
increased capital regulations and its interaction with the FLS on international lending are 
robust to different data cleaning techniques and the inclusion of various control variables. 
These results are also robust to an alternative estimation framework aimed at addressing 
any potential endogeneity between capital requirements and international bank lending, 
as well as to regulatory changes in liquidity regulation over this time period (which could 
have also contributed to the contraction in bank-to-bank lending).  
A more detailed analysis of the different components of the FLS program supports 
these main findings and provides additional detail on precisely how this type of credit 
easing interacted with and amplified the impact of capital regulations. This significant 
interaction between the FLS and increased capital regulations only occurred when the 
full FLS program—targeted at supporting both household and non-financial corporate 
(PNFC) lending—was in place. The interactions are less powerful during the second 
phase of the FLS—aimed at supporting only the much smaller component of PNFC 
lending. This is not surprising, since household mortgage lending is a much larger 
fraction of UK bank lending than PNFC lending.5  
Moreover, we document that this effect is only present for international bank-to-
bank (but not bank-to-nonbank) lending, which is the type of lending behind the recent 
decline in cross-border banking flows since 2012 (as shown in Figures 5a and 5b). These 
results support the thesis that the interaction of increased capital requirements with the 
FLS (which began in 2012) may have contributed to the ‘second phase of banking 
deglobalisation’.  We also find evidence that these spillovers from changes in UK policy 
                                                 
5 Bridges et al. (2014) note that mortgages make up 65% of total UK domestic real sector lending, with PNFC lending making 
up the remaining 35%. 
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on international bank lending can vary across countries. For example, countries with 
stronger bank capital regulations experienced a smaller reduction in cross-border bank 
lending after changes in UK capital requirements.  
In order to assess if our estimates based on UK microeconomic data can explain a 
meaningful amount of the total contraction in international bank flows, however, it is 
necessary to aggregate the results. Based on conservative assumptions, we calculate how 
cross-border bank lending would have evolved in the absence of increased capital 
requirements and their interaction with the FLS. This counterfactual6 suggests that 
international bank-to-bank lending would have been higher in the absence of tighter 
capital requirements, and substantially higher in the absence of their interaction with the 
FLS. This calculation suggests that the level of external UK (global) lending at the end of 
the first phase of the FLS in 2013 was approximately 30% (10%) lower as a result of these 
policies. This is striking as our estimates only capture the policy impact of one country—
and many other countries were simultaneously increasing bank regulations and adopting 
various programs aimed at supporting domestic lending and the real economy. The effects 
of these policies—and their interactions—could explain a significant share of the 
reduction in international lending that occurred not only in the UK, but also in many 
other countries.7  
Overall, this series of results suggests that credit easing designed to support 
domestic lending, such as the UK’s Funding for Lending scheme, might have the 
unintended consequence of amplifying the impact of microprudential capital 
requirements on external lending. The paper does not explicitly test for the domestic 
effects8 of these policies, and instead focuses on the spillover effects to other countries.9 
We show that the magnitude of these types of spillovers can be substantial and have 
global repercussions, even if the country of origin is relatively small.10 An assessment of 
                                                 
6 Just as in any counterfactual exercise, the findings will be subject to the Lucas Critique, but they are nevertheless useful to 
demonstrate the scale and economic significance of our results. 
7 See Forbes (2014) for details on the contraction in cross-border lending by country over this period.  
8 Since these policies were explicitly aimed at domestic activity, our focus on the cross-border impact makes identification 
easier, since reverse causality is less of an issue.  
9 The latter is easier to identify since the policy was not intentionally aimed at reducing cross-border lending. 
10 UK GDP is roughly 3% of world GDP. 
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the welfare consequences is beyond the scope of this paper, but the results have 
widespread implications for issues such as: the availability of credit, country vulnerability 
to foreign and domestic shocks, and the effectiveness of monetary policy.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the various 
regulatory and unconventional monetary policies adopted by the UK during this period, 
explains why these policies and their interactions could impact cross-border lending, and 
summarizes the data. Section 3 develops the empirical framework and presents the main 
results, including a series of robustness tests. Section 4 presents five extensions: an 
analysis of the different phases of the FLS; a breakdown of the impact on different types 
of international lending; a closer look at whether a country’s macroeconomic and 
macroprudential characteristics affected these banking spillovers from UK policies; tests 
for the impact of changes in liquidity regulations; and an analysis to address endogeneity 
concerns. Section 5 calculates the aggregate effects on international bank lending implied 
by the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. UK Bank Capital Regulations, Unconventional Monetary Policy and their Potential 
Interactions  
 
2.1 Background on UK Policies  
Since the introduction of Basel I in 1988, bank capital requirements in most 
countries were set at a fixed value, at or above the minimum of 8 percent of risk-
weighted assets. In the UK, however, regulators also set bank-specific capital 
requirements, otherwise known as minimum trigger ratios11, to address operational, legal 
or interest rate risks, which were not accounted for in Basel I (Francis and Osborne, 
2012). Within this regulatory framework, capital requirements were split into two pillars. 
Pillar 1 capital requirements are set at the minimum Basel I 8 percent level and are meant 
to capture credit and market risks. Pillar 2 capital requirements are supplementary add-
                                                 
11 A trigger ratio is the technical term for capital requirement, since regulatory intervention would be triggered if the bank 
capital to risk-weighted asset ratio fell below this minimum threshold. 
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ons, meant to capture risks that were not contained in the first pillar, that differed across 
individual banks, and which were changed at the supervisors’ discretion. They were 
reviewed either on an on-going basis or every 18 to 36 months. This regulatory regime 
was first implemented by the Bank of England, before responsibility was handed to the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 1997. 
These Pillar 2 capital requirements are the main variable of interest in this paper. 
Understanding how they are determined and what they represent is therefore important 
for the estimation and identification in this paper. The FSA-based regulatory decisions for 
banks relied on a system of guidelines called ARROW (Advanced Risk Responsive 
Operating frameWork), which covered a wide array of criteria related to operational, 
management, business as well as many other risks.12 Econometric analysis13, anecdotal 
evidence from senior policymakers’ speeches14, and parliamentary inquiries into UK Bank 
failures15, all suggest that capital requirement changes within this regulatory framework 
for the period from 1998 to 2006 were mainly determined by factors other than loan 
growth or credit risk. Not surprisingly, following the failure of the British bank Northern 
Rock and the financial crisis that started in 2007, there was a greater focus on credit risk 
in setting microprudential capital requirements.16  
During the time period analysed in this paper, UK authorities implemented two 
main forms of unconventional monetary policy: quantitative easing (QE) and the Funding 
for Lending Scheme (FLS).17 Quantitative easing was initiated by the Bank of England in 
March 2009 in response to the fall in demand associated with the onset of the global 
                                                 
12 The ARROW approach also encompassed prudential risks, but this was not one of the core supervision areas. 
13 Aiyar et al. (2014) show that, while bank size and writeoffs appear to be important determinants of the level of capital 
requirements in the cross-section, bank balance sheet variables can typically not predict quarterly time variation in capital 
requirements. Similarly, Aiyar et al. (2015) estimate a bank panel VAR model on PNFC loan growth and capital requirement 
changes. They find evidence of causality running from changes in capital requirements to loan growth, but not vice versa. 
14 In his high-level review of UK financial regulation prior to the financial crisis of 2008, Lord Turner (then chief executive of 
the FSA), concluded that: ‘Risk Mitigation Programs set out after ARROW reviews therefore tended to focus more on 
organisation structures, systems and reporting procedures, than on overall risks in business models’ (Turner, 2009). 
15 The inquiry into the failure of the British bank Northern Rock concluded that ‘under ARROW I there was no requirement 
on supervisory teams to include any developed financial analysis in the material provided to ARROW Panels’ (FSA, 2008). 
16 This is discussed in more detail in Section 3.1 and our regression analysis considers how changes in bank-specific credit risk 
and international exposures might affect a banks’ Pillar 2 capital requirement. Section 4.5 reports an analysis aimed at 
addressing any potential bias resulting from endogeneity. 
17 Earlier versions of this paper also investigated the impact of forward guidance, which was implemented at the end of the 
period. Measuring and calibrating forward guidance is difficult, however, and results using different approaches were generally 
insignificant and not robust to various iterations of the model. 
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financial crisis in the UK. Under this program the Bank of England purchased a pre-
announced stock of sovereign debt.18 To avoid issues arising from the lack of stationarity, 
we identify changes in quantitative easing in our econometric analysis by using 
announcements on the flow of purchases.  
The second main form of unconventional monetary policy was credit easing in the 
form of the Funding for Lending Scheme. This program was announced in June 2012 and 
coordinated between the Bank of England and Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT). This was 
specifically designed to increase bank lending by ensuring that high bank funding costs 
and capital constraints within the British banking system did not impede lending to the 
UK’s real economy. This scheme consisted of several components—which we exploit in 
our econometric approach to help better identify the impact of this policy. First, the FLS 
provided funding to participating institutions for an extended period at below market 
rates, which likely led to lower interbank funding costs and hence lower effective interest 
rates on mortgage and PNFC loans in the UK.19 Even institutions that did not directly 
participate in the scheme would presumably have benefited from this reduction in 
interbank funding costs. The cost at which banks were able to borrow from the FLS 
facility was decreasing in the amount of the Bank’s “FLS-eligible” lending—which was 
initially defined as lending to PNFCs and households. 
A second component of the program provided preferential capital treatment for 
specific FLS-eligible lending in order to stimulate domestic lending. More specifically, as 
discussed above, UK-regulated banks are subject to a minimum 8% capital requirement 
(Pillar 1) and bank-specific capital requirements (Pillar 2). These bank-specific capital 
requirements can be split into different components, one of which is the “capital-
planning buffer” (also referred to as Pillar 2b). Banks were expected to hold this capital-
planning buffer on top of the total minimum capital requirement (consisting of the 8% 
Pillar 1 requirement and any other Pillar 2 capital requirements). When the bank’s actual 
                                                 
18 This was different than the US program of QE, which focused on the flow of asset purchases and included purchases of 
government debt, as well as mortgage-backed securities. 
19 The FLS allows participants to borrow UK Treasury Bills in exchange for eligible collateral, which consists of all collateral 
eligible in the Bank’s Discount Window Facility.  
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buffer falls below the bank’s planning buffer, this usually triggers heightened scrutiny 
from regulators. Under the FLS, however, banks were allowed to apply for permission to 
reduce this capital-planning buffer by the amount of capital that was pledged on FLS-
eligible lending. While the receipt of this Pillar 2b offset was not automatic and banks 
had to apply for it, this option to offset capital buffers for certain types of lending under 
the FLS would likely have changed the value that banks attached to FLS-eligible versus 
other types of lending.  
A final key aspect of the FLS was how it was changed over time. In response to the 
improvement in household credit availability and conditions and renewed momentum in 
house price inflation, the subsidy to household lending under the FLS was removed on 
January 1st 2014. More specifically, both components of the FLS (the eligibility to count 
towards the type of net lending that warrants additional borrowing allowances from the 
FLS, as well as the capital offset option) were ended for household lending, but not for 
PNFC lending (which had shown less improvement). It was hoped that removing the 
support for household lending, but keeping the program in place for PNFC lending, 
would encourage banks to lend more to PNFCs, including small businesses. These two 
different phases of the FLS therefore provide a natural experiment to further test and 
explore how various components of the policy affected cross-border lending.  
Finally, unconventional monetary policy (in the forms of QE or the FLS) could 
interact with changes in microprudential regulation (in the form of bank capital 
requirements) to have different effects on domestic and external lending growth through 
their different effects on risk weights. The UK, as for all other European countries, 
adopted Basel II and the corresponding model-based risk weights. Unconventional 
monetary policy could affect these risk weights in a number of ways—such as by affecting 
the outlook for the UK macroeconomy, loan terms and interest rates. For example, for 
mortgage lending these risk weights are based on the loan interest rate, the risk of 
unemployment, and loan terms (such as the LTV ratio). Any of these variables could be 
affected by unconventional monetary policy, thereby providing a direct interaction 
between these policies, risks weights, and bank lending. 
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2.2. Why Capital Requirements, Unconventional Monetary Policy, and their Interactions 
could affect International Bank Lending 
Economic theory suggests that tighter capital requirements after the crisis could 
partially account for the observed reduction in cross-border lending. Figure 6a illustrates 
that a rise in capital requirements can lead to a decline in risk-weighted assets and 
lending. But for this to be the case, i) bank equity needs to be more expensive than bank 
debt; and ii) capital requirements need to be a binding constraint on a bank’s actual 
capital choice. Theory20 and evidence21 suggests that this is the case.  Indeed, a series of 
Bank of England research papers on the UK, summarized in Appendix A, documents the 
negative impact on loan supply following a rise in capital requirements.22 Taken at face 
value, the findings from this literature would suggest that the steep rise in 
microprudential capital requirements since 2009 would generate a substantial contraction 
in bank loans, split between domestic and external assets. 
The decision on which type of lending to contract, however, may depend on the 
presence of unconventional monetary policies, including through their impact on relative 
risk weights. If equity is expensive and capital buffers binding, the only way to adjust 
quickly to higher capital requirements is to reduce risk-weighted assets. This is most 
easily achieved by reducing those loans with the highest risk weights. In contrast, 
reducing assets with a zero percent risk weight, such as government debt, will not reduce 
risk-weighted assets at all. Moreover, UK banks have adopted model-based risk weights 
since 2008, which are typically based on borrower risk and loan terms. These models 
typically suggest that the probability of default, and hence the risk weights, for mortgage 
                                                 
20 Condition i) implies a failure for banks of the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem, as otherwise changes in capital 
requirements do not need to affect a bank’s cost of funding. But economic theory provides reasons for why condition i) should 
be satisfied, such as asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and different tax treatment for debt and equity.  
21 Similarly, empirical work documenting the impact of adverse shocks to bank capital on loan growth, as in Bernanke (1983) 
and Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) provides support for this assumption. Several other empirical studies also suggest that 
condition ii) is likely to be satisfied, with wide-ranging evidence that capital requirements were a binding constraint on banks’ 
choices of capital structure during the 1998-2011 period.  See Appendix A. 
22 In theory, higher capital requirements could increase lending at banks with very low or negative net worth, particularly if 
they help to address the debt overhang problem. Similarly, in the medium-run, improvements in the stability of the banking 
system that result from higher capital requirements could improve banks’ abilities to raise funds in the market. Given the time 
period of this study, however, the effect of the decline in loan supply is expected to dominate in the short run. 
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lending increases in unemployment risk, the LTV ratio, and the loan interest rate. As 
illustrated in Figure 6b, if unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates or 
improves the economic outlook and hence reduces the risk weight, it will skew an 
individual bank’s incentives to reduce one type of lending over another in response to 
higher capital requirements. Conceptually, this is how policies such as quantitative easing 
could interact with changes in microprudential requirements. 
The FLS, a type of credit easing, was specifically designed to reduce bank funding 
costs and increase bank lending in targeted sectors. The cost of funds borrowed directly 
from the facility was decreasing with the amount of the new FLS-eligible (i.e., household 
and PNFC sector) lending by the borrowing bank. This is likely to have contributed to a 
general decline in bank funding costs (see Churm et al., 2015). Moreover, the 
corresponding pass-through to interest rates should have had a direct negative impact on 
the probability of default and hence risk weights associated with UK bank loans, just like 
with QE. As discussed above, the FLS had an additional effect of providing preferential 
capital treatment for FLS-eligible lending. This differential treatment by loan type could 
have further reduced risk weights on FLS-eligible domestic lending. This would have 
made qualified domestic lending relatively less capital intensive than international 
lending. Figure 6b shows that, through these channels, the FLS could have magnified the 
impact of coincident changes in microprudential capital requirements on external 
lending. Finally, when the definition of FLS-eligible lending was changed in 2014 to 
exclude household lending (but still included PNFC lending), this would be expected to 
weaken any impact of such policies on the transmission of capital requirements on cross-
border lending. The effect of this change in the FLS could be substantive because 
household lending forms a relatively larger share of UK banks’ balance sheets.  
 
2.3 Data 
Appendix B provides information on the data that is used for our main regression 
analysis. Table B1 defines each of the variables and explains how they were constructed. 
Table B2 provides summary statistics. Our main dependent variable of interest, country-
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specific cross-border bank lending, is volatile in its raw form, with some suspicious 
outliers in the growth rate of lending.23 We therefore adopt several data cleaning 
strategies (with alternatives discussed in the sensitivity analysis). In our base case, we 
drop any growth rates of external lending that are greater than 100% in absolute value. 
We also drop small recipient countries (those with less than £500 million in received 
funds on average) and bank-country lending pairs if the stock of lending did not exceed 
£1 million on average.24 Figure 7 shows the histogram of changes in one of our main 
variables, the change in the bank-specific capital requirements, both before and after 
2007. This figure suggests that the number of increases in capital requirements is greater 
during the more recent period.    
 
3. Empirical Framework and Central Results 
This section begins by discussing the framework to test each of the proposed 
hypotheses about how microprudential capital requirements and their interactions with 
unconventional monetary policies affect international bank lending. Then it reports the 
main results and a series of robustness checks. 
 
3.1 Empirical Framework 
Our central framework to test the proposed hypotheses about the effects and 
interactions of regulatory and unconventional monetary policy on cross-border bank 
lending is the following regression model: 
 
∆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑘𝑘3
𝑘𝑘=0
�𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖)� + 𝛾𝛾(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖)                                       +𝛬𝛬𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ,                                  
                                                 
23 UK bank lending refers to the lending of both UK-owned banks and foreign subsidiaries in the UK, i.e., entities subject to UK 
capital regulation.  
24 We only consider observations of bank-lending pairs if the stock of lending exceeds a share of 0.2% in the current or the 
preceding quarter’s total stock of external lending (rather than large percent changes relative to small stocks). Keeping only 
significant portfolios ensures that we focus on economically meaningful changes in external lending. The 0.2% is chosen 
because it is one tenth of the average portfolio share for UK banks (which is 2%) - i.e., the average UK banks lend to 50 
countries. Results are robust to choosing a higher threshold.  
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where ∆𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the growth rate of lending by bank i to country j at time t. In other words, 
the dependent variable is bilateral cross-border lending by the UK-incorporated PRA 
regulated entity.  ∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the rise25 in bank i’s minimum capital requirement (in percent 
of risk-weighted assets) in quarter t. Following previous work by Aiyar et al. (2014), the 
contemporaneous value and three lags of this term are included to allow lending to adjust 
gradually to changes in the regulatory ratio. 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 is the announced flow of asset purchases, 
scaled by 2009Q1 UK nominal GDP. This only varies with time, which means that, unless 
interacted, it is absorbed by the time effects. 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of zero until 2012Q2, and the value of 1 thereafter. This also only varies with time 
and is meant to capture the idea that during this time period, all UK banks benefited from 
the option to apply for beneficial capital weighting, regardless of their direct participation 
in the scheme. The key to identification is that the extent to which the enactment of the 
FLS will skew a bank’s incentive to cut back one type of lending versus another will 
depend upon the fraction of FLS-eligible to total lending 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(which then merits the 
reduced risk weighting).26 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is therefore interacted with 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, the pre-FLS 2012Q2 
fraction of FLS-eligible to total lending on bank i’s balance sheet, to capture its effect. To 
complete the specification, these terms are also interacted with ∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 independently. 
This simple design has one feature worth highlighting: 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, the country-specific, 
time-fixed effects, is a way of asking whether the same country in the same time period 
borrowing from multiple UK-incorporated banks experiences a larger decline in lending 
from the bank facing a relatively greater increase in minimum capital requirements. This 
                                                 
25 Most studies of UK capital requirement changes (i.e. Bridges et al., 2014; Aiyar et al., 2014a) pool capital requirement 
increases and decreases into one variable.  This is because for the time period that they consider (1997-2007), it is not possible 
to reject the null hypothesis that the sums of coefficients on capital requirement increases and decreases are the same. As 
shown in Appendix Table B3, however, this hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% confidence level for the period 2010-2015. 
This may not be surprising given that banks may have held back on expanding lending when faced with a loosening in capital 
requirements in preparation of higher banking-system wide requirements due to the introduction of Basel III. Therefore, for 
the remainder of the paper, we only model and study the impact of capital requirement increases (tightening). 
26 The change in the relative risk-weights of cross-border to domestic lending only applies to new lending. The fraction of the 
existing stock of these types of lending on the balance sheet is likely to reflect a bank’s business model. Clearly, if a bank 
specialises in domestic lending, one would expect a relatively larger pull back in non-core activities, such as cross-border bank 
lending. On the other hand, a bank that mostly specialises in cross-border bank lending would probably not cut back cross-
border lending more relative to domestic lending. It is of course possible that banks chose to change their specialisation in 
response to the FLS. But given any lack of indication that this policy was permanent, this strikes us as unlikely.  
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term is therefore the direct analogue of the firm-specific, fixed-effects methodology 
pioneered by Khwaja and Mian (2008) to absorb changes in demand conditions. Since the 
comparison is across banks for the same country in a given time period, all demand 
shocks in country j at time t should be absorbed by this term. 
 An important assumption in this regression model is that ∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is exogenous with 
respect to external lending by bank i in country j. Aiyar et al. (2014) document that the 
word ‘cross-border lending’ was not even mentioned in regulatory guidelines pre-2006. 
This concern is more likely after the global financial crisis, however, when regulators 
paid more attention to bank-specific vulnerabilities and adjusted capital requirements 
more regularly (as discussed in Section 2.1). We take two approaches to addressing any 
potential econometric bias from this reverse causality.  
First, our main dependent variable of interest is cross-border bank lending by 
bank i to country j at time t. As discussed in Section 2.1, capital requirements can be split 
into two pillars; Pillar 1 which is set at the minimum Basel I 8 percent level and is meant 
to capture credit and market risks, and Pillar 2 which are supplementary add-ons, 
changed at the supervisors’ discretion, and meant to capture risks not contained in the 
first pillar.  Pillar 2 capital requirements, the main variable of interest in this paper, 
would therefore only be changed in response to external exposures to one individual 
country if these were not adequately captured by the credit risk component in the first 
pillar. Conceptually, one would therefore expect any omitted variable and endogeneity 
bias to be less severe for external than for domestic lending or total credit growth, and 
especially for external lending to one specific country.27  
Nonetheless, endogeneity may still be a concern, so we also adapt a second 
approach that goes further and is discussed in detail in Section 4.5 and Appendix C. This 
extension explicitly tests for any effects of endogeneity and other bank-specific omitted 
variables by modelling the backward and forward-looking determinants of capital 
                                                 
27 This could of course be different for lending to the home country of the bank, such as in the case of the Icelandic banks in 
the UK. Similarly, some countries might be riskier than others and prudential regulators may set capital requirements in 
response to very quickly growing exposure to one particular country. Country-time effects should pick up some of these 
concerns, but not all.  
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requirements and separately identifying the exogenous and endogenous components of 
increases in capital requirements. We use the residuals from this analysis as a measure of 
increases in capital requirements that are exogenous and do not result from changes in 
balance sheet risk. Our main results using the alternative measure of capital requirements 
are very similar, and often stronger relative to the baseline, across a number of 
specifications. This is precisely what would be expected if the degree of endogeneity has 
become smaller under the alternative approach.  
Finally, this main framework used in this paper easily maps into several different 
testable hypotheses. First, to examine how increases in capital requirements affect 
external lending, we sum the 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 coefficients and use an F-test to assess if this sum is 
different from zero. Second, to assess how QE has affected the transmission of changes in 
capital requirements, we sum the 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 coefficients and also use an F-test. Third, to test for 
the impact of the FLS interacted with capital requirements, we also sum the above with 
the 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘 coefficients and perform another F-test. We can also test for independent effects of 
the FLS (with the 𝛾𝛾 coefficient). This framework therefore allows us to simultaneously 
test for the effects of microprudential regulations, and how these microprudential policies 
have interacted with unconventional policies such as QE and the FLS. 
Economic theory predicts that the sign of the main coefficient measuring the 
direct impact of increased capital regulations, ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘
3
𝑘𝑘=0 , should be negative. If equity is 
expensive and capital requirements are a binding constraint on an individual bank’s 
choice of capital structure, one would expect that an increase in capital requirements 
would generate a reduction in loan supply. As discussed above, QE would be expected to 
have a greater impact on domestic relative to external risk weights, so that reducing 
external lending would be a more effective way to respond to increased regulations than 
reducing domestic lending. In other words, QE would amplify the effect of increased 
regulations on external lending and the sign on ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘3𝑘𝑘=0  would be expected to be 
negative.28 The FLS probably reduced interbank funding costs, and hence loan terms and 
                                                 
28 Note that a positive value of the QE variable is expansionary monetary policy.  A negative coefficient is therefore consistent 
with amplifying the effect of changes in capital requirements.  
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interest rates, in the UK. FLS-eligible lending also provided the option to apply for a 
capital offset to all banks, regardless of their participation in the scheme. For all of these 
reasons, the FLS would be expected to have had a much stronger impact on domestic, as 
opposed to external, risk weights. Therefore, the predicted sign on ∑ 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘3𝑘𝑘=0  would also be 
negative, as the FLS would also amplify the effect of increased regulations on external 
lending.   
 
3.2 Baseline Results and Robustness Checks 
The resulting estimates of the model are presented in Table 1. Column 1 shows 
that increases in capital requirements have a negative and statistically significant impact 
on cross-border bank lending, as expected.29  Column 2 adds the FLS term and its various 
interactions. The coefficient on changes in capital requirements continues to be negative 
and significant at the 5% level, as is the coefficient where this is interacted with the FLS 
term and share of FLS-eligible lending. The sum of coefficients on the interaction is -
28.62, which seems large at first sight. This estimate, however, is for a bank with a 
fraction value (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) of 1, meaning that this bank only does FLS-eligible lending. Such a 
bank would, of course, not engage in external lending and hence not enter our sample. A 
more useful way to interpret this estimate is for the value of the FLS interaction term for 
the average bank in the sample, which is 0.153. This means that for the average bank, the 
relevant coefficient is -4.3, which is of a similar magnitude as the coefficient on changes 
in capital requirements. In other words, the presence of the FLS would, for the average 
bank, roughly double the negative impact of increases in capital requirements on external 
lending.   
Column 3 tests for a similar effect of QE. The sum of coefficients on the QE 
interaction has the expected negative sign, but is not significantly different from zero. 
This result is reinforced in columns 4 through 6, which each simultaneously control for 
                                                 
29 The magnitude (of -3.39) is smaller than that reported in Aiyar et al. (2014). When we estimate our model up to 2006 only, 
however, as done in their paper, the magnitude of the coefficient is closer to theirs. One potential explanation for the smaller 
magnitude when more recent data is included is that the adoption of model-based risk weights introduced an additional 
margin of adjustment in response to changes in capital requirements. 
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the effects of QE, the FLS and changes in capital regulations. The coefficients on the FLS 
and QE interaction terms remain negative in each specification, but only the FLS 
interactions are significant. Column 5 includes a number of additional controls for 
individual bank characteristics. Column 6 reports the same analysis, but for easier 
interpretation, rescales 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 (the fraction of FLS-eligible, to total, lending) to take a value of 
one for the average bank. Since this scaling makes it easier to infer the effect for the 
average bank from the tables directly (as shown above), we will use this rescaling for the 
presentation of all subsequent results. Finally, column (7) shows that the point estimate 
for our main variable of interest increases when excluding the ∆KR*QE interaction.  
Table 2 reports a series of robustness checks to the baseline from column 6 in 
Table 1. These tests are particularly important in our analysis given the volatility and 
noise in the banking data, especially for international loan growth. Columns 1 and 2 in 
Table 2 show results when we winsorise the dependent variable at 1/99% and at 5/95%, 
respectively. Column 3 clusters by country-time, as opposed to by bank-time as done in 
the baseline. Column 4 shows estimates when the sample is restricted to larger banks, 
defined as banks with an average balance sheet in excess of 2 billion pounds sterling.  In 
column (5), we exclude affiliates with a parent headquartered in the Euro Area (EA) and 
in column (6), we include an interaction of KR*FLS*Fraction with a dummy that is 1 if 
lending is to a country in the EA. Both of these extensions are aimed at testing if the 
coincident crisis in this region significantly impacts the key results. As expected, our 
country-quarter fixed effects appear to control sufficiently for demand in other parts of 
the world (including the EA) and the interaction with the EA dummy does not turn out 
to be significant or impact our key results. In column (7), we run the regression from 
2008 Q3 onwards to make sure that the results hold in a post-crisis sample. In each of 
these robustness tests, the variable capturing the interaction of the FLS, FLS-eligible 
lending and increased capital requirements is negative and significant, confirming that 
the presence of the FLS amplified the negative impact of increases in capital requirements 
on cross-border lending. 
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In columns (8) and (9), we perform two placebo tests to ensure that the timing of 
the results agrees with the timing of the FLS. In column (8), we examine the impact of 
switching the FLS dummy on in 2008 Q3 – before the FLS was announced. As expected, 
this yields different results. The coefficient drops in size and loses significance. In column 
(9), we let this adjusted dummy equal one until 2012 Q2 – i.e., the part of the post-crisis 
period before the FLS was introduced. Excluding the FLS period now yields a positive and 
insignificant coefficient on the main variable of interest, providing further assurance that 
our results are indeed driven by the introduction of the FLS.   
The key results are robust across these various iterations in Tables 1 and 2, and the 
estimated magnitudes of the key coefficients are quite stable. Increases in capital 
regulation tend to decrease cross-border bank lending and the FLS significantly magnifies 
this effect of capital regulations on international lending. This magnification effect is 
substantial and estimated to roughly double the magnitude of the impact of increases in 
capital requirements for the average bank. QE may also have magnified the effects of 
capital regulations on cross-border bank lending, but any such impact is estimated to be 
substantially smaller and usually insignificant. Therefore, different unconventional 
monetary policies appear to have different effects. The Funding for Lending Scheme, a 
credit easing policy targeted at boosting domestic bank lending, appears to have had the 
consequence of reducing international bank lending. 
 
4. Five Extensions: Two Phases of the FLS, Different Types of External Lending, 
Receiving-Country Characteristics, Regulatory Changes in Liquidity, and Addressing 
Endogeneity 
This section reports five extensions of our baseline model in order to address 
specific aspects of UK regulatory and unconventional monetary policies, as well as 
receiving-country policies, which could bias our results. First, it begins by analysing if 
results change across the different phases of the FLS, which targeted different types of 
lending. Second, it tests for different effects on different types of external lending—
namely bank-to-bank versus bank-to-nonbank international lending. Third, it controls 
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for different macroeconomic, institutional, and regulatory policies in countries receiving 
UK bank lending. Fourth, it examines if changes in regulations related to liquidity 
regulation could affect the results. Finally, it ends with a more detailed discussion of 
potential endogeneity between external lending and capital requirements, including a 
series of additional results aimed at addressing these concerns.  
 
4.1 The Two Phases of the FLS  
As described in Section 2.1, the Funding for Lending Scheme was announced in 
June 2012, but changed on January 1st 2014—about half way through our sample period. 
More specifically, in response to an improvement in the housing market and household 
credit conditions, the Bank of England and HMT decided to reduce both the funding 
subsidy and the beneficial capital weighting for household lending. The preferential 
terms for PNFC (private non-financial corporate) lending, however, were maintained. 
Figures 8a and 8b show the fraction of FLS-eligible lending during the two phases of the 
FLS. When household mortgage lending is included, the share of FLS-eligible lending 
with respect to the total balance sheet is clearly much larger. Therefore, we would expect 
that the impact of the FLS on relative risk weights, and hence the overall effects on 
external lending through the interaction with capital requirements, would become 
weaker after January 2014.  
To test this, column 1 of Table 3 repeats the base case analysis from column 6 of 
Table 1, but includes two sets of FLS interaction terms: one set for the first phase of the 
program that included household and PNFC lending; and one for the second phase which 
only covers PNFC lending. The main coefficient of interest, the interaction between 
changes in capital requirements and FLS-eligible lending, continues to be significant for 
the first phase of the FLS. As expected, it is also slightly larger in magnitude than in the 
estimates that include the full period of the FLS program. On the other hand, the same 
interaction term is no longer significant in the second phase of the program—although 
the coefficient still has the same negative sign. This is intuitive, since mortgage lending is 
typically a much larger fraction of the average bank’s balance sheet than PNFC lending. 
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This result therefore provides some additional support that the estimation framework is 
capturing the effects of the FLS as discussed above.  
One possible caveat to this conclusion is the introduction of the Basel III 
definition of capital in the EU, and hence the UK, in January 2014. This coincides with 
the onset of the second phase of the FLS. At first sight, this could affect the econometric 
results presented above. But it is likely that the transition to Basel III capital standards 
started well before the formal introduction in January 2014, since the details were known 
ahead of time. From an economic perspective, this regulatory change would have led to 
an additional tightening in capital standards. If changes in the FLS were irrelevant, we 
should therefore observe an even greater impact on external lending. But our findings of 
no significant effect are instead consistent with the interpretation that our econometric 
estimate reflects the impact of the second phase of the FLS, rather than the formal 
introduction of Basel III. 
 
4.2 Effects on Different Forms of External Lending 
Next, it is also possible to decompose external bank lending data (both in BIS and 
UK data), into lending to banks abroad and lending to non-banks abroad. Figures 5a and 
5b show these two series for all BIS reporting banks as an aggregate and for the UK’s 
banking system. These figures suggest that much of the contraction in external bank 
lending, and virtually all of the contraction since 2012 (the “second phase” of bank 
deglobalisation) is due to a contraction in bank-to-bank, as opposed to bank-to-nonbank, 
cross-border lending. 
To test if credit easing or regulatory policy had different effects on these different 
types of international bank flows, and in turn if this could explain these trends across 
different types of bank lending, columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 reestimate the baseline model, 
except now split the data into bank-to-bank and bank-to-nonbank lending. The 
coefficient on which we have been focusing—the interaction between changes in 
regulation and FLS-eligible lending, is only statistically significant for bank-to-bank 
lending, but not bank-to-nonbank lending. It is also only statistically significant for the 
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first phase of the FLS, but not the second, as found in column 1. This interaction term is 
also larger in magnitude when estimated only for bank-to-bank lending than for the 
larger lending category. This result could arise from a number of factors, but it is 
noteworthy that the sharpest contraction in cross-border capital flows—which occurred 
in cross-border bank-to-bank lending—is for the type of flow most strongly affected by 
the introduction of the full FLS program (and its interaction with capital regulations). 
This supports the hypothesis that the FLS played a substantive role in explaining the 
second phase of banking deglobalisation.  
 
4.3 Impact of Receiving Country Characteristics  
 The previous analysis has focused on how UK unconventional monetary policies 
have amplified the effect of UK capital regulations on the international lending of UK 
banks. But the policies and characteristics of the foreign countries that are receiving these 
loans could also interact with UK regulations and make them more or less susceptible to 
any spillovers. Avdjiev, Gambacorta, Goldberg and Schiaffi (2016) make this point when 
they show that tighter capital requirements shield a given country from the negative 
effects of global shocks on cross-border bank loans. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) also 
document how country characteristics affected how global banks reallocated liquidity 
internationally during the Global Financial Crisis. Could tighter capital requirements also 
shield a given country from the effects of changes in another country’s policies that affect 
its international bank lending? And could other country-specific characteristics—such as 
its loan demand, domestic institutions, capital controls, and other regulatory policies—
either mitigate or magnify the spillover effects of UK policies on UK cross-border bank 
lending?  
 To test if receiving-country characteristics affect the extent of spillovers from UK 
capital regulations, we focus on the variables that Koepke (2014) highlights as domestic 
“pull factors” affecting cross-border bank lending. More specifically, we test for any 
significant impact of: domestic macroeconomic indicators (GDP growth, domestic equity 
returns, and country risk), the quality of domestic institutions (based on a rule-of-law 
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index), domestic macroprudential policies30 (capital regulation, loan-to-value ratio caps, 
and local currency reserve requirements), and/or or domestic capital controls (using a 
broad measure of all controls on capital inflows and outflows). Appendix Tables B1 and 
B2 provide more detailed definitions, data sources and summary statistics. Our goal is to 
test whether any of these characteristics of foreign markets affect the spillovers from UK 
regulatory policy, so we interact each of the variables above with the change in UK 
capital requirements (∆KR). We continue to include all of the variables and interactions 
from the base case, including all of the bank controls, as shown in Table 1, column 6.31  
 The results from including these various controls for receiving-country 
characteristics are shown in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) report results with the 
additional controls for domestic macroeconomic indicators and institutional quality, 
respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report results for the additional controls for 
macroprudential regulations and capital controls, respectively. Data on two of these 
macroprudential regulations (loan-to-value caps and local currency reserve requirements) 
is more limited and significantly reduces the sample size. These two variables are also not 
individually significant, and including them has no noteworthy impact on the other key 
results, so we drop them in the remaining specifications. Column (5) then includes the 
measures of macroprudential regulations and capital controls simultaneously. Column (6) 
includes all the variables and column (7) includes only the variables which are significant 
(at the 10% level) in at least one specification. 
 The signs for each of the coefficient estimates are consistent across specifications 
and suggest receiving country characteristics can be important. For example, the negative 
coefficients on country risk and capital controls, and positive coefficient on institutions, 
implies that after an increase in UK capital requirements, UK banks cut lending more to 
countries with higher country risk, more capital controls, and weaker institutions.  The 
significance of these estimates, however, varies across specifications. The coefficient 
                                                 
30 We follow Avdjiev et al. (2016) and focus on these three measures of macroprudential regulations from the Cerutti et al. 
(2015) database that have a good cross-country coverage. 
31 Quarterly variables such as returns and CDS spreads are lagged by one quarter before being interacted with capital 
requirements. All cross-country variables (except indices) are winsorised at the 1% level. 
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estimate which has not only a consistent sign, but is also statistically significant across all 
specifications, however, is the positive coefficient on capital regulations. This implies that 
after an increase in UK capital requirements, UK banks cut lending less to countries with 
stronger capital regulations.  
 This significant coefficient on the impact of domestic regulations supports the 
evidence in Avdjiev et al. (2016) that tighter capital requirements can “shield” a given 
country from the negative effects of shocks that originate outside the country’s borders 
(although in this case, the shock originated in one country ‒ the UK ‒ instead of being 
global). These results are also consistent with recent evidence on the transmission of 
macroprudential policies, which finds that in some cases cross-border lending can enjoy a 
comparative advantage relative to domestic banks, as the foreign bank lending is not 
always captured by tighter domestic capital requirements (Buch and Goldberg, 2016; 
Reinhardt and Sowerbutts, 2015).32  
 To summarize, this extension provides some evidence that receiving country 
characteristics can affect the extent to which a country is affected by spillovers from 
changes in UK regulatory policies. Stronger macroprudential regulations, and possibly 
fewer capital controls, lower risk ratings and stronger institutions, can partially mitigate 
any spillover effects from changes in foreign regulatory policies. It is also worth noting 
that the key result from our base analysis—the significant negative coefficient on the 
interaction between capital regulations, the FLS and fraction of FLS lending, remains 
negative and significant in each specification. This suggests that even after controlling for 
a range of receiving-country characteristics, changes in UK regulatory and 
unconventional monetary policy can significantly affect cross-border lending. 
 
4.4 Impact of Regulatory Changes on Liquidity  
 The reduction in international bank-to-bank lending during the first phase of the 
FLS coincides with changes to liquidity regulation in the UK. We believe that these are 
                                                 
32 Consistent with the latter paper, there was no comparable significant effect for regulations on loan-to-value caps or reserve 
local currency reserve requirements, as shown in column (3).  
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unlikely to impact the main results and are, if anything, more likely to lead us to 
underestimate the effect of the first phase of the FLS. Nonetheless, we perform two 
empirical tests to ensure that our results are not biased by the coincident changes in 
liquidity regulation. 
 Basel III introduced liquidity coverage ratios (LCR), meaning that banks need to 
hold a minimum fraction of high quality liquid assets on their balance sheets in order to 
cover outflows of liabilities over specific stress scenarios. The regulatory definition of 
high quality liquid assets (HQLA) includes government debt and central bank reserves, 
but not interbank market loans, in order to reduce systemic risks. The latter has been 
traditionally used by many banks for liquidity management purposes. It is therefore likely 
that there is some substitution away from external (as well as domestic) interbank debt in 
response to the introduction of LCR.  In addition, banks could possibly sell illiquid assets 
(both externally and domestically) as this would increase the ratio of HQLA to stressed 
liability outflows. Within the European Union, the LCR was only introduced at 60% in 
January 2015, increasing on a graduated basis until full implementation.  
 The UK moved earlier than most countries in implementing liquidity regulations, 
however, by introducing individual liquidity guidance (ILG), a prudential liquidity policy 
similar to the LCR.33 There were two macroprudential changes to liquidity regulations in 
the UK: first, the ILG requirements were relaxed in June 2012, by widening the collateral 
eligible to count as liquid assets. Second, in June 2013, the FPC announced that it would 
reduce the required LCR in 2015 to 80%, rising thereafter to reach 100% in 2018. The 
long transition phase to the full LCR makes it unlikely that our main results, which are 
for the period 2012Q3-2013Q4, are impacted. In addition, with the UK’s implementation, 
liquidity requirements were – as described above - actually loosened in June 2012 and 
2013. This would incentivise banks to substitute away from interbank lending by less, 
which would cause our estimated effect of the FLS to understate the true effect.  
                                                 
33 See Banerjee and Mio (2015) for a detailed description of the UK’s ILG regime and an empirical analysis of the ILG on banks’ 
sterling balance sheets. The ILG is, similar to the LCR, designed to make the banking system more resilient to liquidity shocks 
by requiring banks to hold a minimum quantity of high quality liquid assets (HQLA) consisting of cash, central bank reserves 
and government bonds to cover net outflows of liabilities under two stress scenarios lasting different periods.  
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 Nonetheless, to assess the possible impact of liquidity regulations, we perform two 
exercises. The first is already reported in columns (5) through (7) of Table 1, where we 
include the share of liquid assets in banks’ balance sheets as a control variable. The 
variable is negative and insignificant, and does not meaningfully impact the results. For a 
second test, we use data on the UK’s ILG regime to check whether the introduction of 
ILG or subsequent tightening of the ILG percent requirement has any bearing on our 
main results. Specifically, we define the variable Δ ILG as a dummy that is equal to 1 in 
the quarter when ILG requirements were introduced or tightened and 0 otherwise. To 
match the specification of capital requirements, we include the contemporaneous value 
and three lags of this dummy. The bottom of Appendix Table B4 reports the tests of joint 
significance. It shows that the introduction/tightening of ILG had a significantly negative, 
albeit quantitatively small, effect on external bank lending. Moreover, column (2) shows 
that the effect is insignificant for cross-border bank-to-bank lending, which is where the 
greatest contraction in international lending occurred (as discussed in Section 1 and 
shown in Figure 5). Most importantly, our main results on the interaction of the FLS with 
capital requirements are not affected. 
 
4.5 Potential Endogeneity between Capital Requirements and External Lending 
An important assumption in our main regression model in Section 3.1 is that 
∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is exogenous with respect to external lending by bank i in country j. As discussed 
in Section 2.1 and Section 4.4, however, the regulation of capital requirements around the 
world has changed significantly since the Global Financial Crisis. There is now a greater 
focus on balance sheet and credit risks. In the UK’s current regulatory regime, Pillar 1 
capital requirements are meant to address credit and market risks directly. Changes in 
Pillar 2 capital requirements, the main variable of interest in this study, are made at the 
discretion of the regulator to address risks that are not believed to be captured in the 
Pillar 1 capital requirement. If the first pillar captured all of the credit and market risks 
contained in balance sheet variables, then one would expect changes in Pillar 2 to be 
orthogonal to changes/growth rates in balance sheet and credit risks. This section tests 
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this proposition and then reports results from an alternative specification which attempts 
to control for any endogeneity between capital requirements and external lending.  
To begin, we examine whether the current, lagged or annual growth rate of 31 
different variables that supervisors could have taken into account in their regulatory 
decisions predict changes in Pillar 2 capital requirements. Appendix C discusses the 
estimation and approach in more detail. To summarize, we use single and Bayesian Model 
Averaging regressions to identify the most important predictors of increases in capital 
requirements. The results (in Appendix Table C2) suggest that the strongest predictors are 
domestic lending growth to the real sector, financial and operating charges, and other 
operating income. These variables alone explain 30% of the 𝐾𝐾2 of increases in capital 
requirements. This suggests that the majority of capital requirement increases are due to 
non-balance sheet risk, in line with our initial assumption. 
Nonetheless, there is still a valid concern about endogeneity, so we pursue a 
second and more formal approach to see if this could affect our central estimates. More 
specifically, we use the key variables and results from above to predict increases in capital 
requirements using two different models (as shown in Appendix Table C3 and discussed 
in more detail in Appendix C). We then use the residuals from these two regressions as 
two alternative measures of ∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖, which we refer to as ‘Model 1’ and’ Model 2’. These 
should be more reflective of increases in capital requirements due to operational risk, as 
opposed to credit and market risk, and should therefore not be affected by changes in 
cross-border lending.  In other words, these residuals are orthogonal to balance sheet 
characteristics by construction. 
Table 5 reports regression results with these alternative and more exogenous 
measures of capital requirements than used in the base case. Before discussing the results, 
it is important to note that the baseline sample is different from the main regression 
sample. This is because supervisors adopted a new regulatory form, the FSA003 form, 
after the UK’s financial crisis in 2008. This form is a critical source of information to 
identify key variables used in setting capital requirements during this relevant post-crisis 
period. The availability of this form causes the number of observations in our sample to 
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shrink substantially from 47,421 to 13,411. Column 1 in Table 5 begins by evaluating if 
this change in the sample affects the main results (while still using our initial measure of 
changes in capital requirements). Reassuringly, the baseline results are robust to 
estimating our regression model on this much shorter sample, although now the 
estimated magnification effect of the FLS on changes in capital requirements is larger.34  
Next, columns 2 and 3 show results when we use our constructed and more 
exogenous measures of increases in capital requirements, i.e., the residual measures based 
on the regressions that predict regulatory changes with detailed balance-sheet 
information. The sum of our main coefficients of interest, ∑ 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘3𝑘𝑘=0 , remains positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that our main results are robust to addressing 
endogeneity. It is also worth noting that this coefficient is quantitatively larger than in 
column 1. This could occur if any reverse-causality between external lending growth and 
changes in capital requirements generates an upward bias in ∑ 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘3𝑘𝑘=0  in a reduced-form 
regression.  
Some authors argue that the contemporaneous term in panel time-series 
regressions is subject to a greater endogeneity bias than the lagged dependent variables.35 
Therefore, we re-estimate our baseline model, but drop the contemporaneous capital 
requirement term everywhere. The results are presented in columns (4) to (6) of Table 5, 
for the baseline estimates and then the two models controlling for endogeneity, 
respectively. There are no substantive differences from the baseline estimates.36   
Then, in columns (7) and (8) of Table 5, we put the variables which were found to 
be important predictors of capital requirements in Table B3 directly into our main 
regression (instead of using the residuals from the estimates of changes in requirements).37 
The results are again consistent with our baseline estimates.   
                                                 
34 This is not surprising as these estimates, obtained with the shorter sample, are equivalent to removing a large number of 
zeros in the interaction term in our application. 
35 See for example, Cornett, Strahan and Tehranian (2011). 
36 For the application in this paper, it is of course impossible to know if we fail to model an important part of the transmission 
mechanism by omitting the contemporaneous term. For this reason, we follow the standard approach in this literature and 
include the contemporaneous term in the baseline regression. Nonetheless, it is reassuring to know that excluding this term 
does not significantly change our results. 
37 Specifically, we include the contemporaneous value and three lags to match the lag structure of capital requirement changes.  
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The analysis so far has relied on backward-looking determinants of changes in 
capital requirements, since balance sheet data do not reflect a bank’s future lending 
strategy. It is likely, however, that supervisors also consider forward-looking measures of 
international portfolio performance when setting capital requirements. To account for 
this potential source of endogeneity, we repeat the extension controlling for endogeneity, 
except now also include a measure of exposure-weighted changes in GDP forecasts (for 
the receiving countries).38 This variable is intended to capture any future changes in the 
economic outlook of those countries to which the bank is exposed. It is therefore a 
measure of future international portfolio performance, which supervisors may take into 
account when setting capital requirements today.  In column (9) of Table 5, we report our 
second-stage results after including this exposure-weighted GDP forecast variable in the 
first-stage regression (reported in column (4) of Appendix Table C3). In column (10) of 
Table 5, we include this exposure-weighted GDP forecast variable directly in the 
regression. The coefficient on this variable is negative in the first-stage regression, 
consistent with the idea that a bank exposed to countries forecasted to perform more 
strongly than before is less likely to increase capital requirements. In both of the second-
stage regressions predicting cross-border lending, the key results do not change 
significantly.39  
To summarize, the issue of whether an explanatory variable is exogenous with 
respect to the dependent variable is often difficult to resolve in an applied economics 
paper. In the absence of appropriate instruments for our main variable of interest, we 
have modelled changes in bank-specific capital requirements as a function of a wide array 
of balance sheet and regulatory variables, both backward and forward looking, and used 
the residuals from those regressions as a more exogenous measure of changes in capital 
requirements. This exercise suggests that our baseline results are robust to concerns about 
endogeneity. This is not surprising given our theoretical prior that most of the credit risk 
                                                 
38 GDP forecasts are from the historical IMF WEO database. The variable is defined as two-year ahead forecasted real GDP 
growth less last year’s two-year ahead forecast. Exposure weights are calculated using the portfolio shares by bank and 
multiplying by the GDP forecast. We use the change in GDP forecasts (instead of their levels) because some banks might 
specialize in lending to emerging markets (with high growth rates), while others lend more to advanced economies (with 
lower growth rates). Our measure captures improving/deteriorating future portfolio performance while controlling for this. 
39 We have also checked that including GDP growth forecasts into Model 1 yields similarly robust results. 
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exposure should have been reflected in the Pillar 1 capital requirement, so that 
movements in Pillar 2 capital requirements (our key explanatory variable) should reflect 
mostly non-balance sheet risks, and hence be exogenous with respect to bank balance 
sheet variables. 
 
5. Aggregate Effects on International Bank Lending 
The purpose of this paper is to asses if changes in regulation and credit easing 
contributed to the sharp deglobalisation in banking since the financial crisis, and 
especially since 2012. This contraction in cross-border lending is documented in 
aggregate BIS and UK banking-system data, but the analysis in this paper is based on 
individual UK bank balance sheet data. The granularity of these microeconomic data was 
critical to identify and estimate our model, but it raises a valid question whether the 
interaction we focus on in this paper is economically relevant in explaining the broader 
international macroeconomic trends. Next, we attempt to bridge this gap with an 
aggregation exercise. This requires a number of assumptions, and therefore the results 
should be taken as illustrative only. 
In order to perform this exercise, we use our central results from the estimated 
regression model reported in column (1) of Table 3, which includes results for the 
different phases of the FLS. We use the estimates from this table of the impact of those 
coefficients which are statistically significant. Since only the sums of coefficients 
associated with (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖)∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are statistically significant, only these terms are used for 
the aggregation exercise (and not the impact of the capital requirement itself).  We then 
use, for each bank, the counterfactual growth rates together with initial stocks of total 
external lending in pound sterling as of 2011Q3 (one year before the FLS was introduced) 
to estimate a series of counterfactual stocks. The resulting series is then summed across 
banks to give an aggregate series of international bank lending by UK banks.  
Figure 9a shows the resulting calculation of international bank lending after 
removing the estimated effects of the interaction of the FLS and increases in capital 
regulations (in red). Actual data on international bank lending is also shown on the figure 
29 
 
(in blue). A comparison of the two lines suggests that aggregate external bank lending 
would have been substantially higher in the absence of interaction between the FLS and 
increased capital regulations. Specifically, external bank lending was £1300bn before the 
introduction of the policies and fell to about £1060bn by the end of 2013. The red line 
shows a decline to only £1130bn predicted in the absence of the FLS combined with 
increased regulations. In other words, the £240bn decline in international bank lending 
would have been a decline of only £170bn (or 30% smaller) in the absence of these 
policies. Since the decline in UK external bank lending during this period accounts for a 
third of the decline in the corresponding BIS data covering most banking flows, this 
suggests that just the interaction of the FLS and UK capital requirements can explain 
about 10% of the global contraction in bank lending during this period. The magnitude of 
the drag on external bank lending from the FLS is therefore economically meaningful, 
not only for the UK, but globally  
Finally, the results in Section 4.2 suggest that most of the negative effect of the 
FLS on international bank lending occurred through reductions in bank-to-bank lending 
(instead of bank-to-nonbank lending). Therefore, we repeat this aggregation exercise to 
focus on the estimated effects of the FLS on aggregate bank-to-bank lending. For this 
calculation, we use the estimated coefficients reported in column 2 of Table 3, which 
finds that changes in capital requirements ((𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖)∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), as well as its interaction with the 
FLS ((𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖)∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), are significant. We therefore remove the effects of both of these 
terms when constructing a counterfactual estimate for international bank lending.  
The resulting calculations are shown in Figure 9b. The blue line shows actual 
international bank-to-bank lending. The green line shows estimated lending absent the 
effects of increased capital regulations, and the red line shows estimated lending absent 
the effects of increased capital regulations and its interaction with the FLS. The 
calculations suggest that external bank-to-bank lending would have been higher in the 
absence of increases in capital requirements. It would have been substantially greater in 
the absence of the FLS and its interaction with higher capital requirements. In fact, the 
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FLS seems to have more than doubled the effect of tighter capital requirements on 
international bank-to-bank lending. 
  
6. Conclusions 
Following the Global Financial Crisis, many countries around the world 
strengthened their prudential policies to improve the resilience of their financial systems. 
Many of the world’s major central banks also introduced quantitative and credit easing to 
stimulate demand, support lending, and boost growth. At the same time, international 
bank lending experienced a historically unprecedented contraction—not only in the 
initial phase of the crisis, but in a “second phase of deglobalisation” that started in 2012. 
This paper examines if these developments are related, using the experience of the United 
Kingdom as a case study. 
While a number of papers have analysed the effects on domestic lending of recent 
changes in prudential policies, quantitative and credit easing,40 we instead focus on the 
effects of these policies on international lending. Cross-border lending has declined by 
substantially more than domestic lending since the 2008 crisis. Unlike previous work, we 
also focus on the second phase of banking deglobalisation (instead of the initial 
contraction in 2008/2009). Perhaps most innovative, we focus on the interactions 
between various forms of unconventional monetary policy and changes in 
microprudential capital requirements. Specifically, we investigate if policies such as 
quantitative easing and the UK’s Funding for Lending Scheme amplified the impact of 
higher capital requirements on external lending. 
Our results show that the interaction of increased capital requirements with 
quantitative easing may have contributed to a reduction in international lending, but any 
such effect is estimated to be insignificant, small in magnitude, and not robust to different 
perturbations of the model. In contrast, credit easing in the form of the FLS appears to 
have substantially magnified the contraction in external lending resulting from increased 
                                                 
40 For evidence of how UK domestic lending was affected by changes in prudential regulation, see Aiyar et al. (2015) and 
Bridges et al. (2014); for evidence on the effects of the FLS and QE, see Churm et al. (2015). Also see the papers summarized in 
Appendix A. 
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capital requirements. More specifically, our baseline estimates suggest that a 100 basis 
point rise in capital requirements reduced external loans by 3.4%, and this effect roughly 
doubled in the presence of the FLS. These results are robust to a number of tests and 
extensions, including a model aimed at addressing potential endogeneity. We also find 
that the contraction in external lending, and primary effects of the FLS on external 
lending, occurred through reductions in bank-to-bank lending (as opposed to 
international bank-to-nonbank lending), consistent with the broader global contraction 
in international lending. An additional extension shows that the spillover effects of 
increased capital requirements were significantly smaller in receiving countries with 
stronger macroprudential regulation, especially in the form of increased capital 
regulations. 
Finally, a back of the envelope aggregation of these results based on micro-level 
UK bank data indicates that the estimated effects of changes in UK capital regulations and 
the FLS on external bank lending were also important at an aggregate level. Indeed, these 
effects can explain a meaningful part of the contraction in international bank lending, 
especially in international bank-to-bank lending that occurred from mid-2012 to 2014. 
This paper does not asses these effects and interactions in other countries, but given that 
many countries around the world have also increased regulations, adopted quantitative 
and credit easing, and simultaneously experienced a reduction in their own cross-border 
lending, it is likely that the  UK effects documented here also occurred elsewhere. When 
any such effects are aggregated across countries, they could go even further in explaining 
the second phase of banking deglobalisation.  
Unconventional monetary policy, and its interaction with regulatory policy, can 
have important global spillovers. This paper does not, however, assess the welfare 
implications of these spillovers.41 This would require a complicated assessment of the 
various costs and benefits of international lending, as well as an analysis of any second-
round effects of changes in UK prudential policies, the FLS, and quantitative easing (such 
                                                 
41 For recent overviews of related issues, see Bussière, Schmidt and Valla (2016), Koepke (2015), and Shin (2013). 
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as from stimulating domestic growth, which could support exports from other 
economies).  
Our results do, however, clearly show that a policy targeted at boosting domestic 
lending can unintentionally reduce international lending. The magnitude of these 
spillovers can be significant, with global implications, even if the policy originated in a 
relatively small country. The analysis also shows that monetary policies can magnify the 
effects of bank-specific regulatory policies—an important interaction that is typically 
ignored by standard macroeconomic analysis. Future research could explore whether 
these types of interactions also occurred in other countries and in conjunction with 
which types of regulatory and unconventional monetary policies.  
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Table 1: Baseline Results 
 
 
 
Note: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent 
variable is the quarterly percentage change in external bank lending. The data are discussed in Section 2.3 
and variables are discussed in Section 3.1 and Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-time 
level. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The sample period is 1997Q1 
to 2015Q1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δ Capital Requirements -3.394*** -4.014** -2.570* -2.430 -2.136 -2.136 -3.567*
p-val 0.00430 0.0272 0.0666 0.209 0.286 0.286 0.0561
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 5.099* 3.621 4.737* 4.737* 6.004**
p-val 0.0550 0.177 0.0778 0.0778 0.0232
Δ Capital Requirements * Fraction 0.568 -2.332 -2.722 -0.416 -0.0280
p-val 0.914 0.654 0.609 0.609 0.973
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS * Fraction -28.62** -24.89** -28.21** -4.311** -4.761**
p-val 0.0169 0.0375 0.0225 0.0225 0.0119
Δ Capital Requirements * QE -0.781 -0.828 -0.784 -0.784
p-val 0.156 0.153 0.182 0.182
FLS * Fraction 0.0170 0.0157 0.0293 0.00447 0.00463
s.e (0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0362) (0.00554) (0.00554)
Liquid Asset Share -0.0336 -0.0336 -0.0337
(0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0224)
Bank Size 0.0225*** 0.0225*** 0.0221***
(0.00688) (0.00688) (0.00689)
Commitment Share 0.0394** 0.0394** 0.0396**
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0198)
Deposit Share -0.0277 -0.0277 -0.0256
(0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0276)
Writeoffs (Changes) -0.931** -0.931** -0.925**
(0.451) (0.451) (0.454)
Writeoffs (Changes, L) -0.356 -0.356 -0.357
(0.434) (0.434) (0.436)
Writeoffs (Changes, L2) -0.0556 -0.0556 -0.0789
(0.409) (0.409) (0.409)
Writeoffs (Changes, L3) -0.575 -0.575 -0.609
(0.414) (0.414) (0.414)
Observations 47,421 47,421 47,421 47,421 47,421 47,421 47,421
R-squared 0.13 0.134 0.133 0.134 0.135 0.135 0.135
Adjusted R-squared 0.0341 0.0343 0.0343 0.0345 0.0356 0.0356 0.0354
Bank Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-Time-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time
Total External Lending Growth
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Table 2: Robustness
 
Note: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly percentage change in external 
bank lending. Column (1) winsorises the LHS variable at the 1% level. Column (2) winsorises the LHS variable at the 5% level.  Column (3) clusters standard errors at 
the country-time instead of the bank-time dimension. Column (4) excludes banks with less than £2bn balance sheet on average. Column (5) excludes affiliates with a 
parent headquartered in the EA. Column (6) includes an interaction of KR*FLS*Fraction with a dummy that is 1 if lending is to a country in the Euro Area. Column (7) 
runs the regression from 2008 Q3 onwards. Columns (8) and (9) are placebo tests. Column (8) checks whether switching on the FLS dummy in 2008 Q3 (before the 
FLS was announced) yields different results. Column (9) lets this adjusted dummy run only until 2012 Q2 – i.e. the part of the post-crisis period before the FLS was 
introduced.  The data are discussed in Section 2.3 and variables are discussed in Section 3.1 and Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-time level. *** is 
significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. The sample period is 1997Q1 to 2015Q1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Winsorise at 1% Winsorise at 5% Different clustering
Drop small 
banks
Exclude EA 
banks
Vis-à-vis EA 
interaction From 2008 Q3
Switch 'FLS' on 2008 Q3 
to 2015 Q1 - Placebo test
Switch 'FLS' on 2008 Q3 
to 2012Q2 - Placebo test
Δ Capital Requirements -2.112 -1.888 -2.136 -1.913 -2.403 -2.132 -0.521 -5.149 -2.625
p-val 0.289 0.289 0.270 0.359 0.240 0.287 0.812 0.120 0.427
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 4.716* 4.231* 4.737* 4.750 4.907* 4.752* 2.027 1.547 -0.326
p-val 0.0781 0.0791 0.0752 0.102 0.0697 0.0772 0.453 0.616 0.909
Δ Capital Requirements * Fraction -0.410 -0.390 -0.416 -0.486 -1.211 -0.415 -0.238 1.003 -2.389
p-val 0.614 0.595 0.572 0.570 0.246 0.611 0.840 0.528 0.160
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS * Fraction -4.315** -3.883** -4.311*** -4.501** -4.319** -4.229** -5.074** -3.311 2.498
p-val 0.0222 0.0224 0.00672 0.0202 0.0312 0.0444 0.0127 0.117 0.197
Δ Capital Requirements * QE -0.783 -0.689 -0.784 -0.821 -0.704 -0.785 -1.009* -1.232* -1.207**
p-val 0.182 0.196 0.150 0.188 0.243 0.182 0.0824 0.0190 0.0254
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS * Fraction * EA -0.317
p-val 0.819
FLS * Fraction 0.00440 0.00294 0.00447 0.00642 0.00627 0.00448 0.00622 0.00510 -0.00145
s.e (0.00553) (0.00500) (0.00481) (0.00602) (0.00568) (0.00553) (0.00553) (0.00443) (0.00480)
Observations 47,421 47,421 47,421 39,677 45,570 47,421 16,512 48,489 48,489
Adjusted R-squared 0.0359 0.0386 0.0356 0.0403 0.0359 0.0355 0.0302 0.0349 0.0349
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-Time-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Bank-Time Bank-Time Country-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time
Total External Lending Growth
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Table 3: The Two Phases of the FLS 
 
Note: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. In column (1), the 
dependent variable is the quarterly percentage change in external bank lending; in column (2), the quarterly 
percentage change in external bank lending to other banks; in column (3), the quarterly percentage change in 
external bank lending to nonbanks. The data are discussed in Section 2.3. Variables are discussed in Section 3.1 
and Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-time level. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level, and * at the 10% level. The sample period is 1997Q1 to 2015Q1. 
  
(1) (2) (3)
Total External Lending Bank-to-Bank Lending Bank-to-Nonbank Lending
Δ Capital Requirements -1.687 4.616 -1.670
p-val 0.390 0.122 0.423
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 1 3.099 0.747 0.949
p-val 0.280 0.870 0.772
Δ Capital Requirements * Fraction 1 -0.795 -4.904* -1.534
p-val 0.644 0.0677 0.464
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 1 * Fraction 1 -5.801** -6.829** -4.640
p-val 0.0212 0.0126 0.130
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 2 9.551* 12.13* 4.702
p-val 0.0757 0.0995 0.396
Δ Capital Requirements * Fraction 2 -0.348 1.910 2.269
p-val 0.797 0.384 0.175
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 2 * Fraction 2 -1.597 -2.876 -3.275
p-val 0.465 0.285 0.187
Δ Capital Requirements * QE -0.801 -1.028 -1.456**
p-val 0.168 0.196 0.0289
Observations 47,421 29,317 43,051
R-squared 0.135 0.199 0.152
Adjusted R-squared 0.0358 0.0645 0.0429
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Country-Time-Effects YES YES YES
Cluster Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time
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Table 4: Controlling for Receiving-Country Characteristics 
 
Note:  The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent 
variable is the quarterly percentage change in external bank lending. Column (1) includes interactions of capital 
requirement changes with GDP growth, stock market returns and CDS spreads (as proxies for loan demand). 
Column (2) includes a proxy for the institutional quality of a country, namely an indicator on the strength of 
the rule of law. Column (3) adds measures for the intensity of macroprudential regulation taken from Cerutti et 
al. (2015). Column (4) includes the overall capital account restriction index from Fernandez et al. (2015). 
Column (5) includes both capital regulation and capital controls. Column (6) keeps all variables except the 
previous insignificant prudential regulations, in which case the sample size drops by half. Column (7) keeps all 
variables that were significant at the 10% level in at least one specification. Quarterly variables, such as returns 
and CDS spreads, are lagged by one quarter before being interacted with capital requirements. The data are 
discussed in Section 2.3 and variables are discussed in Sections 3.1 and 4.3 and Appendix B. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank-time level. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. The 
sample period is 1997Q1 to 2015Q1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Domestic macro 
indicators Institutional Quality Macropru Capital Controls
Macropru and 
Capital Controls All All Sig
Δ Capital Requirements 2.677 -4.534* -5.143 -0.113 -2.529 5.975 6.283
p-val 0.370 0.0506 0.106 0.967 0.404 0.277 0.255
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 3.628 4.217 -3.253 3.928 0.488 -1.173 -2.366
p-val 0.279 0.137 0.516 0.239 0.900 0.762 0.532
Δ Capital Requirements * Fraction -1.577 -0.836 0.253 -2.007 -1.834 -2.073 -2.435*
p-val 0.101 0.365 0.843 0.125 0.176 0.142 0.0934
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS * Fraction -4.947*** -4.801** -7.506*** -5.955** -7.397*** -7.781*** -6.810**
p-val 0.00957 0.0108 0.00195 0.0172 0.00469 0.00343 0.0115
Δ Capital Requirements * QE -1.059 -0.816 -1.148 -0.547 -0.688 -1.076 -0.867
p-val 0.169 0.177 0.128 0.427 0.305 0.182 0.217
FLS * Fraction 0.00804 0.00722 0.0178** 0.00557 0.00755 0.00129 -2.70e-05
s.e (0.00653) (0.00563) (0.00848) (0.00792) (0.00941) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Δ Capital Requirements * GDP Growth -0.301 -0.0974
p-val 0.574 0.865
Δ Capital Requirements * Returns -0.110 -0.102
p-val 0.247 0.304
Δ Capital Requirements * CDS Spread -0.00731* -0.00896** -0.00627
p-val 0.0871 0.0474 0.129
Δ Capital Requirements * Institutional Quality 2.197* -2.797 -2.112
p-val 0.0832 0.269 0.402
Δ Capital Requirements * Capital Regulation 9.725*** 5.773** 6.563** 5.485**
p-val 0.00108 0.0229 0.0101 0.0343
Δ Capital Requirements * LTV 0.339
p-val 0.657
Δ Capital Requirements * Reserve Requirements -1.401
p-val 0.136
Δ Capital Requirements * Capital Controls -8.281** -7.443* -13.21 -14.15**
p-val 0.0487 0.0828 0.122 0.0475
Observations 22,979 42,529 11,519 35,078 28,170 20,582 21,474
Adjusted R-squared 0.0424 0.0349 0.0477 0.0380 0.0457 0.0477 0.0459
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-Time-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time
Total External Lending Growth
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Table 5: Exogeneity of Capital Requirements 
 
 
Note: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the quarterly percentage change in 
external bank lending. Column (1) reproduces our baseline result for the shorter period for which we could identify exogenous changes in capital 
requirements due to availability of regulatory data (2009 Q2 to 2013 Q4) - see Section 4.5.  Column (2) uses the residuals from Model 1 in Table C3 as an 
exogenous measure of capital requirement tightening. Column (3) uses the residuals from Model 2 in Table C3 as an exogenous measure of capital 
requirement tightening. Column (4) drops contemporaneous capital requirement tightening and only retain the three lags. Columns (5) and (6) again use 
the residuals from Model 1 and 2 in Table C3, but now without contemporaneous changes in capital requirements. Columns (7) and (8) include the 
contemporaneous and three lags of the variables found to be important predictors of capital requirements in Table C3. Columns (9) and (10) repeat the 
exercise of columns (3) and (8) for the specification where we also include our measure of exposure-weighted GDP forecasts, either by including it as a 
determinant of capital requirements in Table C3 or directly into the regression. The exposure-weighted GDP forecast is from the IMF WEO database and 
defined as forecasted real GDP growth averaged over the following two years minus the same forecast last year. The data and variables are discussed in 
Sections 2.3 and 3.1, respectively, and Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-time level. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, 
and * at the 10% level. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Baseline for Model 
1,2 Sample Model 1 Model 2
Drop 
contemporaneous KR
Drop contemporaneous KR 
- Model 1
Drop contemporaneous 
KR - Model 2
Include KR determinants 
directly - Model 1
Include KR determinants 
directly - Model 2 Model 2 + Forecast
Include KR det. directly - 
Model 2 + Forecast
Δ Capital Requirements -0.477 4.440 4.019 -1.087 2.413 1.793 -1.073 -2.148 4.723 -2.149
p-val 0.835 0.313 0.350 0.583 0.463 0.580 0.650 0.378 0.253 0.378
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 3.093 9.621 3.137 3.339 2.023 0.971 3.804 4.744 8.560 4.748
p-val 0.332 0.198 0.599 0.169 0.675 0.816 0.251 0.171 0.223 0.171
Δ Capital Requirements * Fraction -0.323 -1.835 -1.676 0.368 -1.484 -1.457 0.790 1.190 -3.175 1.192
p-val 0.860 0.528 0.544 0.777 0.458 0.437 0.659 0.531 0.310 0.533
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS * Fraction -8.129*** -13.97** -11.33** -7.956*** -9.599** -9.413** -7.134*** -9.356*** -11.83** -9.361***
p-val 0.00635 0.0154 0.0252 0.000859 0.0157 0.0138 0.0137 0.00189 0.0414 0.00206
Δ Capital Requirements * QE -0.922 -3.434*** -3.038*** -0.469 -2.021*** -1.824*** -0.941* -1.062* -3.185*** -1.063*
p-val 0.119 0.000377 0.00136 0.304 0.00614 0.00950 0.0991 0.0764 0.000690 0.0781
FLS * Fraction 0.00735 -0.00501 -0.00340 0.00809 -0.00246 -0.00170 0.0141* 0.00894 -0.00561 0.00894
s.e (0.00843) (0.00758) (0.00760) (0.00707) (0.00688) (0.00677) (0.00819) (0.00843) (0.00761) (0.00843)
Exposure weighted GDP forecast -0.0257
s.e (1.233)
Observations 13,411 13,411 13,411 14,241 14,241 14,241 13,324 13,370 13,411 13,370
Adjusted R-squared 0.0368 0.0369 0.0368 0.0357 0.0353 0.0356 0.0436 0.0376 0.0367 0.0375
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
KR determinants directly NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-Time-Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time
Total External Lending Growth
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Appendix A: Summary of Bank of England Research on Impact of Prudential Policy 
 
This survey briefly summarizes recent Bank of England studies on the impact of prudential 
policy on the banking system and the broader economy. Appendix Table A1 provides more 
detail about each paper.  
Several Bank of England staff papers examine balance sheet adjustment in response to 
changes in UK microprudential capital requirements. If bank equity is more expensive than 
debt and changes to capital requirements are binding, a bank will either have to raise outside 
capital, retain earnings or cut back risk-weighted assets in response to a rise in capital 
requirements. These studies test the last implication and report the annual impact in 
response to a 1% rise in capital requirements. Frances and Osborne (2009) find that this 1% 
rise in capital requirements in 2002 would have led to a decline in aggregate lending (risk-
weighted assets) by 1.2% (2.4%) four years later. Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek (2012) use 
more recent data and report that PNFC lending growth declines by 5.7%. Bridges, Gregory, 
Nielsen, Radia and Spaltro (2014) find that commercial real estate, other PNFC and 
household lending contract by 8.07%, 3.86% and 0.94%, respectively. Uluc and Wieladek 
(2015) report that individual mortgage loans contract by 5.1%. Aiyar, Calomiris, Hooley, 
Korniyenko and Wieladek (2014) find that cross-border lending falls by 5.4%. Bahaj, Bridges, 
Malherbe and O’Neil (2016) find a smaller impact when lending prospects are good and 
legacy assets healthy. Banerjee and Mio (2015) do not find an impact of individual liquidity 
guidance ratios on real economy lending. Despite different methods and datasets, all of these 
papers concur that a rise in capital requirements leads the affected bank to contract lending. 
Credit substitution from foreign branches can offset this effect, however, either via direct 
competition (Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek, 2012) or by arbitraging the regulatory impact 
on their affiliated UK subsidiary (Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieladek, 2014). In aggregate, these 
channels are estimated to offset the negative loan supply impact of higher capital 
requirements by 40%. Similarly, Reinhardt and Sowerbutts (2015) find evidence for leakages 
in a cross-country panel: foreign banks lend more to the non-bank sector in response to 
tightening in domestic macroprudential capital regulation. They do not find evidence for 
leakages in the case of lending standards regulation, which usually applies to all products sold 
in a country. 
Therefore, whether changes in capital requirements have real effects depends on the scope of 
credit substitution. Indeed, Noss and Tofano (2014) find a significant impact on UK lending, 
but not real GDP, in a VAR model. De Marco and Wieladek (2015) study the impact on SME 
asset growth of a rise in the capital requirements of their main relationship bank with firm-
level data. They find that SMEs contract asset growth by between 3.5% and 6.9%, and that 
this is driven by a reduction in bank funding. Overall, this suggests that firms which are 
dependent on a single bank are probably most affected.  
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Two recent papers examine how regulation taken abroad affects lending in the UK. Hills et 
al. (2016) find that macroprudential regulation in foreign countries does not affect aggregate 
UK domestic lending, consistent with the idea that the UK is a core business destination for 
most banks. However, more granular results show that foreign affiliates increase lending to 
UK households once there is a tightening in LTV regulation in their home countries. 
Danisewicz, Reinhardt and Sowerbutts (2015) show that the organisational form of affiliates 
matters for spillovers to UK interbank lending, with foreign branches transmitting foreign 
capital regulation to a greater degree than foreign subsidiaries. 
Evidence on the interactions between prudential policy and the transmission of monetary 
policy has been more limited (with the exception of this paper). Aiyar, Calomiris and 
Wieladek (2014) find evidence that changes in interest rates only affect small banks in the 
UK, while changes in capital requirements affect all banks, suggesting that monetary policy 
would not be able to offset negative effects of prudential policy via the bank lending channel. 
De Marco and Wieladek (2015) confirm these findings with firm-level data.    
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Appendix Table A1 
Paper Title and Authors Key Finding 
FSA No. 36 Bank regulation, capital and credit supply: 
Measuring the impact of prudential regulation, 
2009, William Francis and Matthew Osborne  
Changes in capital requirements pose binding constraints on banks 
actual capital ratios. A one percent rise in capital requirements in 2002 
would have led to a decline in aggregate lending (total risk-weighted 
assets) by 1.2% (2.4%) four years later. 
BoE No. 445 Does macropru leak? Evidence from a UK policy 
experiment, 2012, Shekhar Aiyar, Charles 
Calomiris and Tomasz Wieladek 
A one percent rise in capital requirements leads to a bank-specific 
5.7% contraction in PNFC lending within a year. In aggregate, credit 
substitution (leakage) by foreign branches offsets this effect by one 
third.   
BoE No. 485 Identifying channels of credit substitution when 
bank capital requirements are varied, 2014, 
Shekhar Aiyar, Charles Calomiris and Tomasz 
Wieladek 
Credit substitution operates through a regulatory arbitrage (foreign 
branches substitute for subsidiaries belonging to the same banking 
group) and competition channel (foreign branches substitute for any 
banks contracting credit). No evidence for capital markets leakage is 
found. 
BoE No. 486 The impact of capital requirements on bank 
lending, 2014, Jonathan Bridges, David Gregory, 
Mette Nielsen, Silvia Pezzini, Amar Radia and 
Marco Spaltro 
A 1% rise in capital requirements reduces mortgage, commercial real 
estate and other PNFC lending by 0.94%, 8.07% and 3.86%, 
respectively. 
BoE No. 494 Estimating the impact of changes in aggregate 
bank capital requirements during an upswing, 
2014, Joseph Noss and Priscilla Toffano 
A 15 bps rise in capital requirements leads to a 1.4% lending 
contraction after four years. No statistically significant impact on real 
GDP is found. 
BoE No. 497  The international transmission of bank capital 
requirements: evidence from the United 
Kingdom, 2014, Shekhar Aiyar, Charles 
Calomiris, John Hooley, Yevgeniya Korniyenko 
and Tomasz Wieladek 
A one percent rise in capital requirements reduces cross-border 
interbank lending by 5.4%. Core business destination countries are not 
affected. 
BoE No. 508 How does credit supply respond to monetary 
policy and bank minimum capital requirements?, 
2014, Shekhar Aiyar, Charles Calomiris and 
Tomasz Wieladek 
Monetary policy only affects small banks via the bank lending 
channel, while changes to capital requirements affect all banks. No 
evidence for interaction among these instruments is found.  
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BoE No. 524 On a tight leash: does bank organisational 
structure matter for macroprudential spillovers?, 
2015, Piotr Danisewicz, Dennis Reinhardt and 
Rhiannon Sowerbutts 
Foreign branches transmit capital regulations in their home country to 
a greater extent than foreign subsidiaries of the same banking group. 
BoE No. 536 The impact of liquidity regulation on banks, 
2015, Ryan N Banerjee and Hitoshi Mio 
Banks reduce their reliance on wholesale funding and financial loans 
in response to the introduction of individual liquidity guidance 
regulation. But they do not find evidence that the tightening of 
liquidity regulation caused banks to shrink their balance sheets, nor 
reduce the amount of lending to the non-financial sector. 
BoE No. 546 Regulatory arbitrage in action: evidence from 
banking flows and macroprudential policy, 2015, 
Dennis Reinhardt and Rhiannon Sowerbutts 
Foreign banks expand lending to the domestic non-bank sector when 
domestic macroprudential capital policies are tightened. This does not 
happen when (i) capital regulations also apply to foreign banks and (ii) 
for lending standards regulations which usually apply to all lending in 
a country. 
BoE No. 572 Capital requirements, risk shifting and the 
mortgage market, 2015, Arzu Uluc and Tomasz 
Wieladek 
A 1% rise in the capital requirement leads the affected bank to cut 
back mortgage loan size by about 5.4%. Consistent with risk shifting, 
loans to the riskiest borrowers are not affected. 
BoE No. 573 The real effects of capital requirements and 
monetary policy: evidence from the United 
Kingdom, 2015, Filippo De Marco and Tomasz 
Wieladek 
SMEs contract asset growth by about 3.5% - 6.9% following a 1% rise 
in the capital requirement of their main relationship bank. Monetary 
policy only affects the asset growth of these SMEs which borrow from 
small banks. The effects of monetary policy and capital requirements 
reinforce each other for SMEs that borrow from small banks. 
BoE No. 593 What determines how banks respond to changes 
in capital requirements?, 2016, Saleem Bahaj, 
Jonathan Bridges, Frederic Malherbe and Cian 
O’Neill 
Bank lending is less affected by changes in capital requirements when 
lending prospects are good and legacy assets are healthy. 
BoE No. 595 Cross-border regulatory spillovers: How much? 
How important? What sectors? Lessons from the 
United Kingdom, 2016, Robert Hills, Dennis 
Reinhardt, Rhiannon Sowerbutts and Tomasz 
Wieladek 
Macroprudential regulation in foreign countries does not affect UK 
domestic lending, consistent with the idea that the UK is a core 
business destination for most banks. More granular results show that 
foreign affiliates increase lending to UK households once there is a 
tightening in LTV regulation in their home countries. 
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Appendix B: Data, Statistics, and Additional Results 
 
Appendix Table B1 - Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Cross-border bank 
lending growth 
Percent change in cross-border lending to banks 
plus non-banks [CC15], only banks [CC15A] or 
only non-banks [CC15B]. 
Bank of England CC 
forms.  
Capital 
Requirements 
(Changes) 
FSA/PRA-set minimum ratio for Pillar 1 plus 
Pillar 2 capital-to-risk weighted assets (RWA). 
[NHD500/NHD510 for BSD3 and 108A/(12.5* 
70A) for FSA3. 
Bank of England BSD3 
form for data up to 2008 
Q1. FSA3 form thereafter.  
Fracdummy Fraction of bank lending to UK households and 
PNFCs in total bank lending. 
Bank of England BT, AL 
and CC forms. 
QE Changes in the size of the Bank of England’s 
Quantitative Easing programme scaled by UK 
nominal GDP as of 2009 Q1 (expressed in %). 
Bank of England MPC 
minutes. 
Commitment 
Share 
Commitment ratio: Ratio of total commitments 
divided by total assets. [BT43/BT40]
 Bank of England BT forms. 
Liquid Asset Share Holdings of liquid assets (cash, market loans, 
British government stocks) scaled by non-equity 
liabilities. [(BT21+BT23+BT32D)/(BT20-BT19)].
 
Bank of England BT forms. 
Deposit Share Deposit Share. Fraction of the banking 
organization’s balance sheet financed with core 
deposits [(BT2H + BT3H)/(BT20-BT19)]. 
Bank of England BT forms. 
Writeoffs Writeoffs (Changes) [80T from BSD3 and 32J 
from FSA15]. 
Bank of England BSD3 
forms for data up to 2008 
Q1 and FSA15 forms for 
data thereafter. 
Bank size Bank size: The log of a bank’s total assets in levels 
(£1000s), deflated by CPI inflation [BT40]. 
Bank of England BT forms. 
Exposure-
weighted GDP 
forecast  
Exposure weighted GDP forecast is defined as 
forecasted real GDP growth averaged over the 
following two years minus the same forecast last 
year. 
IMF WEO database. 
GDP Growth Annual Real GDP Growth in %. (NGDP_RPCH). IMF WEO database. 
Returns Domestic equity returns: MSCI total returns 
index (end period). Quarterly % returns. 
MSCI from Datastream. 
CDS Spread. 5-year sovereign CDS spreads. Bloomberg. 
Institutional 
Quality 
Country-specific estimates of the strength of the 
rule of law, ranging from -2.5 to +2.5 with 
positive values indicating stronger institutions. 
World Bank World 
Governance Indicators.  
Capital Regulation, 
LTV regulations, 
Local Reserve 
Requirements 
Quarterly indices of the intensity of 
macroprudential policy regulation proxied by 
cumulated tightening minus cumulated 
loosening actions (2000-2014).   
Cerutti et al. (2015). 
Capital Controls Overall restrictions index (ka) ranging from 0 to 
1, with 1 being more restrictive. 
Fernández et al. (2015)  
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Appendix Table B2: Summary Statistics 
 
Note: The data are discussed in Section 2.3. Variables are discussed in Sections 3.1 and 4.3. Fraction refers to 
the fraction of domestic non-financial lending to total lending. Summary statistics for Quantitative Easing 
refer to the 7 quarters in which the size of the asset purchase programme was altered (see Figure 4b). 
 
 
Appendix Table B3: Tightening vs. Loosening of Capital Regulations 
 
Note: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent 
variable is the quarterly percentage change in external bank lending. In column (1), the sample period is 
1997Q1 to 2007Q4. In column (2), the sample period is 2010Q1 to 2015Q1. The data are discussed in 
Section 2.3. Variables are discussed in Section 3.1 and Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank-time level. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
 
Variable Median Mean p25 p75 Obs. 
External bank lending growth -0.005 -0.036 -0.158 0.096 47421
External bank-to-bank lending growth -0.039 -0.138 -0.415 0.086 31791
External bank-to-non-bank lending growth -0.005 -0.036 -0.127 0.072 41839
Fraction 0.087 0.153 0.007 0.236 47421
Liquid Asset Share 0.272 0.359 0.172 0.529 47421
Bank Size (Log, deflated) 16.445 16.712 15.034 18.46 47421
Commitment Share 0.506 0.517 0.33 0.691 47421
Deposit Share 0.204 0.294 0.044 0.506 47421
Writeoffs 0.004 0.013 0 0.015 47421
GDP Growth 2.786 2.999 1.205 4.652 40143
CDS Spread 40.798 118.167 6.078 129.882 26057
Returns 3.541 2.852 -4.482 10.099 31385
Institutional Quality 1.294 1.025 0.531 1.732 42529
Capital Controls 0.125 0.213 0.05 0.3 35078
Capital Regulation 0 0.277 0 0 31539
LTV Regulation 0 0.574 0 1 11529
Reserve Requirements (Local) 0 -0.431 -1 0 32963
min max
Quantiative Easing 3.6 3.834 1.8 5.339 7
(1) (2)
pre-GFC 1997-2007 post-GFC 2010-2015
Δ Capital Requirements Tightening -6.177*** -4.794***
p-val 0.00669 0.00560
Δ Capital Requirements Loosening -2.697 -0.959
p-val 0.106 0.491
Test if Tightening diff. from Loosening (p-val) 0.207 0.053
Observations 41,792 17,186
Adj. R-squared 0.0468 0.0284
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES
Country-Time-Effects YES YES
Cluster Bank-Time Bank-Time
Total External Lending Growth
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Appendix Table B4: Controlling for Liquidity Regulations 
 
 
Note: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. In column (1), 
the dependent variable is the quarterly percentage change in external bank lending; in column (2), the 
quarterly percentage change in external bank lending to other banks; in column (3), the quarterly 
percentage change in external bank lending to non-banks. Δ ILG is a dummy that is equal to 1 if bank-
specific Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG) requirements were introduced or increased, 0 otherwise (see 
section 4.4 for details). The data are discussed in Section 2.3. Variables are discussed in Section 3.1 and 
Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-time level. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level, and * at the 10% level. The sample period is 1997Q1 to 2015Q1 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
Total External 
Lending
Bank-to-Bank 
Lending
Bank-to-Nonbank 
Lending
Δ Capital Requirements -1.804 4.626 -1.571
p-val 0.354 0.118 0.445
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 1 3.735 0.991 1.135
p-val 0.197 0.826 0.726
Δ Capital Requirements * Fraction 1 -0.754 -4.974* -1.620
p-val 0.658 0.0638 0.444
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 1 * Fraction 1 -6.141** -6.900** -4.798
p-val 0.0160 0.0113 0.121
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 2 9.668* 12.13* 4.648
p-val 0.0723 0.0991 0.402
Δ Capital Requirements * Fraction 2 -0.290 2.088 2.358
p-val 0.829 0.343 0.164
Δ Capital Requirements * FLS 2 * Fraction 2 -1.670 -3.024 -3.319
p-val 0.444 0.262 0.181
Δ Capital Requirements * QE -0.764 -0.999 -1.487**
p-val 0.173 0.206 0.0205
Δ Liquidity Regulation (ILG) -0.0647** -0.0242 -0.0539*
p-val 0.0360 0.660 0.0670
Observations 47,421 29,317 43,051
Adjusted R-squared 0.0359 0.0645 0.0432
Bank Controls YES YES YES
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Country-Time-Effects YES YES YES
Cluster Bank-Time Bank-Time Bank-Time
48 
 
Appendix C: Exogeneity of ∆𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑲𝒋𝒋,𝒕𝒕 
 
An important assumption in our regression framework is the exogeneity of changes in 
capital requirements with respect to bank balance sheet variables. Given the importance of this 
assumption to our framework, it needs to be explored more formally. In order to do so, we test if 
bank balance sheet variables that supervisors had access to at the time of the regulatory decision 
can statistically predict regulatory changes. If this is the case and the balance sheet variables can 
explain a high fraction of the variation in capital requirements, then our initial assertion would 
have been invalid. If all relevant balance sheet variables have been included in the model 
predicting changes in capital requirements, however, then the residual will reflect any capital 
requirement changes that reflect non-balance sheet risk. We can therefore use the residual from a 
model using balance sheet variables to predict changes in capital requirements to verify if the 
results change when we use these “non-balance sheet based” capital requirement changes in our 
model.  
We have collected 31 such variables. These are mainly taken from the FSA003 form, the 
reporting form that regulators had access to when making regulatory decisions. This form also 
contains information on several measures of balance sheet risk, such as interest rate, counter-
party or foreign exchange rate risk. We also incorporate additional balance sheet information that 
may be relevant, but was not on this form, such as the growth in lending to different domestic 
and external sectors, liquid assets and the deposit ratio. This is a fairly complete and exhaustive 
list of the information available to the regulators when making their assessments. Of course, 
supervisors could also have considered additional information and less tangible measures, but this 
extensive set of variables should allow us to create a fairly exogenous measure of changes in 
capital regulations.  
We then explore if changes in capital requirements can be predicted by any of these 
variables with the following regression framework: 
 
∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , 
 
where ∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 is the non-zero change in capital requirements for bank i and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is the matrix of 
exogenous variables that helps to predict this particular instance of ∆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖. Under the assumption 
that the information set contained in the vector of predictors 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, the residual (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) will reflect 
capital requirement changes due to non-balance sheet risk, which are exogenous with respect to 
balance sheet items. There is also uncertainty about whether these predictors affect the 
supervisory decisions contemporaneously or with a lag. For these reasons, we use growth rates 
that are contemporaneous, lagged, or taken with respect to the same value a year ago.  
We adopt a two-step approach to isolate the most important predictors of changes in 
capital requirements among these 93 potential candidate predictors. First, we regress each 
individual predictor against the change in the capital requirement with a single regression. The 
results are reported in Appendix Table C1. We then retain those predictors which are statistically 
significant.  This allows us to reduce the universe of candidate predictors to about 18. However, 
we have little information on whether supervisors looked at these indicators together or 
individually to form their judgement about a capital requirement change. With the 18 relevant 
variables, there are over 262,144 regression models that could be explored for this purpose. We 
therefore follow the Bayesian Modelling Approach (BMA) proposed in the economic growth 
literature and discussed in more detail below to explore all of these possible model 
49 
 
combinations.42 Appendix Table C2 presents the results from this exercise. This suggests that 
variables such as domestic real sector growth and financial operating charges are strong predictors 
of tightening in Pillar 2 capital requirements.  
Finally, we use all of the important predictors from this BMA exercise in multiple 
regressions to derive our measure of exogenous changes in capital requirements. Recognising the 
second step nature of the BMA output, we include all predictors that have a posterior inclusion 
probability (PiP) of either 40 or 20 percent in regression equations (1) and (2). Results are 
reported in Appendix Table C3. Both regression equations include external lending growth, 
which is not statistically significant in either case. We only retain predictors that entered as 
significant in both of these regression equations in regression equation 3.  We refer to regression 
equations two and three in Table C3 as models 1 and 2 for the remainder of the paper. Each of the 
resulting balance sheet variables used to predict changes in capital requirements are highly 
statistically significant in both of these regression models. Therefore, balance sheet characteristics 
do predict changes in capital requirements. According to the 𝐾𝐾2, in these equations, however, 
they can only explain 25% to 30% of the variation in capital requirements. Assuming that we 
included all relevant balance sheet variables, this means that between 70% and 75% of the 
variation in capital requirement changes is due to non-balance sheet risk. This is consistent with 
the regulatory approach during this period; credit and market risk would typically be accounted 
for in the Pillar 1 capital requirement. The Pillar 2 add on, which is the focus of this paper, is 
primarily used as a discretionary supplement to account for other risks.  
Balance sheets, however, only summarize the state of a given bank in a backward looking 
way. In practice supervisors probably also took expected portfolio performance into account. To 
provide a proxy for this, we weight changes in GDP forecasts based on the countries to which a 
bank is exposed. This variable is an indicator of changes in the future economic outlook of these 
countries that a given bank lends to, and hence an important indicator of future international 
portfolio performance. We include this in column (4) of Table C3. The coefficient has the 
expected negative sign, implying that better expected international portfolio performance is 
associated with lower capital requirements. 
Given that the residuals of these regressions are, by definition, orthogonal to the balance 
sheet characteristics, we can use them as measures of changes in non-balance sheet risk capital 
requirements. Using the residuals obtained from model (1) and model (2) and/or including the 
forward-looking measures in column (4) to address any endogeneity in capital requirements does 
not make a significant difference to our key results. 
 
Details on Bayesian Model Averaging  
This section provides more detail on our implementation of Bayesian Model Averaging. 
We have up to 18 (k) possible predictors of the change in capital requirements, but only some of 
these predictors seem to matter the most for regulatory decisions. The economic growth literature 
has proposed Bayesian Model Averaging to objectively determine which variable has the highest 
explanatory power. We follow this approach here to select the best predictors of changes in 
capital requirements based on their posterior inclusion probabilities.   
The idea underlying Bayesian Model Averaging is to consider the results for all the 
models which include all possible combinations of the regressors and average them. The weights 
in the averaging are given by the posterior model probabilities 𝑝𝑝(𝑀𝑀|𝑦𝑦) where M is the model and 
                                                 
42 See Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2004). 
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y is the data. In order to compute the posterior model probabilities by means of Bayes rule, two 
elements are required. First, we need the posterior distribution of the parameters in each model 
M, which is used to derive the marginal likelihood 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦|𝑀𝑀). Second, we need to specify the prior 
distribution of the models 𝑝𝑝(𝑀𝑀). With marginal likelihood and model prior distributions at hand, 
the model posterior probabilities can be derived as: 
 
𝑝𝑝(𝑀𝑀|𝑦𝑦) ∝ 𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦|𝑀𝑀)𝑝𝑝(𝑀𝑀).                          
 
As to the setup of the priors, we follow Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001). In particular, for 
each model, we compute the posterior probability distribution of the parameters by assuming an 
uninformative prior on the variance of the residuals and on the intercept. For the remaining 
regression coefficients we use the g-prior of Zellner (1986), setting 𝑔𝑔 = 1
max (𝑁𝑁,𝑘𝑘2) .We set a 
uniform prior for the distribution of the models.43 Since we only have up to 8,388,608 models, we 
follow Magnus, Powel and Pruefer (2010) and evaluate each one of them to obtain the exact 
likelihood, without having to rely on MCMC methods for approximation. High posterior 
inclusion probabilities indicate that, irrespective of which other explanatory variables are 
included, the regressor has a strong explanatory power. We argue that this is therefore an 
efficient and objective way to select the best predictors of the changes in capital requirements. 
                                                 
43 In practical terms, Bayesian Model Averaging is implemented with the STATA BMA function documented in De Luca and 
Magnus (2011). 
  
Appendix Table C1: Determinants of Capital Requirements: Single Regressions 
 
Note: The table presents the estimated parameter values cross-sectional regressions of capital requirement tightening on regulatory and 
balance sheet variables. Column (1) uses the lagged change of the respective variables scaled risk weighted assets in the quarter before. 
Column (2) uses changes of respective variables scaled risk weighted assets in the quarter before averaged over 1 year and lagged by 
one quarter. Column (3) uses the current change of the respective variables scaled risk weighted assets of the quarter before. See 
Section 4.5 and this appendix for further information on how we obtain the exogenous component of capital requirement changes. 
Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged Growth Annual Growth Current Growth
Financial and Operating Income 0.0168 0.238*** -0.0106
(0.0214) (0.0895) (0.0271)
Interest income 0.0319 0.338** -0.00886
(0.0326) (0.170) (0.0447)
Fee and commission income 0.0228 0.593** -0.0485
(0.0474) (0.292) (0.0783)
Trading income/losses 0.0371 -0.272 -0.226
(0.128) (0.228) (0.169)
Trading income/losses on trading investments 0.0813 0.315 0.0719
(0.0914) (0.476) (0.144)
Trading income/losses on foreign exchange -0.108 -0.866 -0.278
(0.201) (1.024) (0.303)
Realised gains/losses on financial assets & liabilities -0.0363 3.301*** 0.664
(0.273) (1.021) (0.837)
Dividend income -0.138 0.0151 0.170
(0.277) (0.672) (0.235)
Other operating income -0.0956 0.795*** 0.558**
(0.271) (0.159) (0.236)
Financial & Operating Charges 0.0358 0.466*** 0.00455
(0.0407) (0.152) (0.0591)
Other costs 0.00737 0.376*** 0.0125
(0.0266) (0.119) (0.0362)
(of which) Impairment/Provisions -0.0278 0.861*** 0.204*
(0.0796) (0.271) (0.123)
Net profit (loss) 0.0305 -0.154 -0.0725
(0.0505) (0.337) (0.0636)
Write-offs 0.0886 -0.161* -0.00731
(0.183) (0.0961) (0.202)
Counterparty risk capital component 0.391 -0.436 -1.352
(0.649) (1.984) (1.006)
Interest Rate Risk (PRR, stan. approach) -0.214 0.602 0.00829
(0.411) (1.582) (1.048)
Foreign currency Risk (PRR, stan. approach) 2.019*** 1.679 -0.895
(0.615) (2.672) (0.945)
Position, FX and commodity risk (internal models) -0.676* 0.0545 0.837*
(0.393) (0.813) (0.438)
Pillar 1 credit risk capital component 0.188* 0.484 0.197
(0.108) (0.428) (0.222)
Pillar 1 market risk capital component -0.175 0.397 0.0776
(0.226) (0.949) (0.422)
Deposit Share 0.00454 0.0131 0.00359
(0.0498) (0.0178) (0.0384)
Liquid Asset Share 0.00758 -0.00147 0.0175
(0.00825) (0.00701) (0.0120)
Commitment Share -0.0106 0.00931 0.0178
(0.0246) (0.00881) (0.0282)
Leverage Ratio 0.0283 0.0126 -0.00162
(0.0453) (0.0232) (0.0566)
External bank lending growth 0.00910 0.0195* 0.00629
(0.00648) (0.00989) (0.00617)
External bank-to-bank lending growth -1.46e-05 0.0120* 0.00659
(0.00296) (0.00663) (0.00419)
External bank-to-non-bank lending growth 0.00673 0.00890 -0.00374
(0.00609) (0.0102) (0.00824)
Total balance sheet growth 0.0104 0.0253 0.00738
(0.0111) (0.0187) (0.0110)
Domestic real sector lending growth -0.00513 0.0122* 0.0160*
(0.00607) (0.00644) (0.00814)
Domestic financial lending growth 0.000716 0.00362 0.00669
(0.00527) (0.00620) (0.00423)
Domestic interbank lending growth 0.00285 0.00326 0.00331
(0.00342) (0.00493) (0.00320)
Capital Requirement Tightening
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Appendix Table C2: Determinants of Capital Requirement Tightening: BMA 
 
Note: The table presents the estimated parameter values of Bayesian Model Averaging regressions. PiP stands for the posterior 
inclusion probability. See this Appendix and section 4.5 for further information. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** is 
significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
  
(1) (2)
Variable Transformation Coefficient PIP
Constant 0.00934***
(0.000939)
Financial and Operating Income Annual Growth -0.00256 0.08
(0.0540)
Interest income Annual Growth -0.0818 0.22
(0.230)
Fee and commission income Annual Growth -0.00573 0.06
(0.0913)
Realised gains/losses on financial assets & liabilities Annual Growth 0.943 0.34
(1.523)
Other operating income Annual Growth 0.0152 0.09
(0.169)
Other operating income Current Growth 0.468 0.74
(0.339)
Financial & Operating Charges Annual Growth 0.541* 0.95
(0.278)
Other costs Annual Growth 0.00913 0.08
(0.0607)
Impairment/Provisions Annual Growth 0.0461 0.12
(0.163)
Impairment/Provisions Current Growth -0.000106 0.05
(0.0277)
Write-offs Annual Growth 0.00155 0.05
(0.0662)
Foreign currency Risk (PRR, stan. approach) Lagged Growth 0.0836 0.07
(0.495)
Position, FX and commodity risk (internal models) Lagged Growth -0.0473 0.08
(0.221)
Position, FX and commodity risk (internal models) Current Growth 0.0297 0.07
(0.193)
Pillar 1 credit risk capital component Lagged Growth 0.00327 0.05
(0.0376)
External bank lending growth Annual Growth 0.000758 0.08
(0.00400)
External bank-to-bank lending growth Annual Growth 0.000167 0.06
(0.00200)
Domestic real sector lending growth Annual Growth 0.000125 0.05
(0.00239)
Domestic real sector lending growth Current Growth 0.0150*** 0.96
(0.00520)
Observations 126
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Appendix Table C3: Determinants of Capital Requirement Tightening: Keeping 
Important Predictors 
 
Note: The table presents the estimated parameter values cross-sectional regressions of capital requirement 
tightening on regulatory and balance sheet variables. Column (1) keeps variables which have in Table C2 a 
posterior inclusion probability (PiP) of 40 percent in addition to external bank lending growth. Column (2) 
includes variables with a PiP of 20 percent. Column (3) keeps only the significant variables.  Column (4) 
includes a measure of forward-looking growth surprises, namely, the forecasted real GDP growth averaged 
over the following two years minus the same forecast last year from the IMF’s WEO database.  See this 
Appendix and Section 4.5 for further information on how we obtain the exogenous component of capital 
requirement changes. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Other operating income (Current Growth) 0.596*** 0.664*** 0.617*** 0.507***
(0.163) (0.178) (0.163) (0.180)
Financial & Operating Charges (Annual Growth) 0.461*** 0.818*** 0.487*** 0.447***
(0.118) (0.287) (0.115) (0.117)
Domestic real sector lending growth (Current Growth) 0.0166*** 0.0158** 0.0162*** 0.0158**
(0.00598) (0.00619) (0.00607) (0.00637)
External bank lending growth (Annual Growth) 0.00817 0.00856
(0.00899) (0.00900)
Realised gains/losses on financial assets & liabilities (Annual Growth) 2.116
(1.287)
Interest income (Annual Growth) -0.356
(0.243)
Exposure weighted GDP forecast -0.262**
(0.104)
Constant 0.00943*** 0.00910*** 0.00930*** 0.00916***
(0.000884) (0.000879) (0.000876) (0.000865)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 + Fcast
Observations 126 126 126 126
R-squared 0.259 0.299 0.255 0.283
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.263 0.237 0.259
  
  54 
Figures 
Figure 1: Contraction in global capital 
flows 
Figure 2: The retrenchment in global banking 
contrasts to growth in other international 
financial exposures 
 
 
 
Sources: IMF International Finance Statistics and World 
Economic Outlook Database. Note: For each quarter, flows are 
summed over all available country data and then smoothed by 
averaging over the current and previous quarter. 
 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics and BIS Banking 
statistics. Note: Gross lending in different types of assets is the 
cumulated (exchange-rate adjusted) USD bn flow in cross-border 
lending since 2002 Q1 summed across the BIS reporters for which 
data was available and then added to 2001 Q4 stocks.  
 
Figure 3: Cross-border bank lending vs. domestic credit 
Figure 3a: For all countries Figure 3b: For the UK  
  
Source: BIS. Note: Gross bank-to-bank and bank-to-nonbank 
lending is the cumulated (exchange-rate adjusted) USD bn 
change in cross-border lending since 2002 Q1 summed across 
the BIS reporters for which data was available and then added 
to 2001 Q4 stocks. Domestic credit is the USD value of credit to 
the non-bank private sector summed across all BIS reporter 
(after converting into USD).  
Source: BIS. Note: Gross bank-to-bank and bank-to-nonbank 
lending is the cumulated (exchange-rate adjusted) USD bn change in 
cross-border lending since 2002 Q1 and then added to 2001 Q4 
stocks. Domestic credit is the sterling value of credit to the UK non-
bank private sector. The dashed line indicates the introduction of 
the FLS. 
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Figure 4: Capital Requirements and Asset Purchase Announcements in the UK 
4a: UK Capital Requirements 4b: UK Asset Purchase Announcements 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of England. Note: UK-resident banks’ capital 
requirements refer to both Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. Changes are 
weighted by total risk weighted assets. 
Source: MPC minutes. 
 
 
Figure 5: Bank-to-Bank vs. Bank-to Nonbank lending 
Figure 5a: All BIS reporters Figure 5b: UK Only 
  
Source: BIS. Note: Gross bank-to-bank and bank-to-nonbank 
lending is the cumulated (exchange-rate adjusted) USD bn change in 
cross-border lending since 2002 Q1 summed across the BIS reporters 
for which data was available and then added to 2001 Q4 stocks. 
Domestic credit is the USD value of credit to the non-bank private 
sector summed across all BIS reporter (after converting into USD). 
Source: BIS. Note: Gross bank-to-bank and bank-to-nonbank 
lending is the cumulated (exchange-rate adjusted) USD bn change in 
cross-border lending since 2002 Q1 summed across the BIS reporters 
for which data was available and then added to 2001 Q4 stocks. 
Domestic credit is the USD value of credit to the non-bank private 
sector summed across all BIS reporter (after converting into USD). 
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Figure 6A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6B 
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Figure 7: Tightening in Capital Requirements 
Figure 7a: 2007 and before Figure 7b: After 2007 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of England. 
 
Source: Bank of England. 
 
Figure 8: Fraction of FLS-eligible Lending: 
Figure 8a: Household and PNFC Figure 8b: PNFC Only 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of England. Note: The fraction is defined as UK-
resident banks lending to the UK household (HH) and PNFC 
sector divided by total lending (external + domestic financial + 
HH/PNFC lending).   
 
Source: Bank of England. Note: The fraction is defined as UK-
resident banks lending to the UK household (HH) and PNFC 
sector divided by total lending (external + domestic financial + 
HH/PNFC lending).   
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Figure 9: Aggregation Exercise: International Bank Lending 
Figure 9a: Aggregate Lending Figure 9b: Bank-to-Bank Lending Only 
 
 
 
 
Note: See section 5 for the description of the aggregation 
exercise. 
 
Note: See section 5 for the description of the aggregation 
exercise. 
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